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The modern policeman is assisted by a variety of electronic devices.1
Many of these devices enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement by
enabling the police to see or hear what they otherwise could not. Yet
these devices may also pose serious threats to Fourth Amendment
values.2 One electronic mechanism that raises an especially trouble-
some challenge to the Fourth Amendment is the beeper.
The beeper is a miniature, battery-powered radio transmitter that
emits recurrent signals at a set frequency. By covertly attaching the
beeper to a subject's property and monitoring its signals with a
separate receiver, the police can electronically track the property, and
often the subject, for distances of several miles and for as long as
several weeks.3 In its technology and secrecy the beeper closely re-
sembles other forms of electronic surveillance. But because the beeper
is capable of revealing only location and movement, it can be viewed
as a sense enhancement device that is no more intrusive than tradi-
tional visual tailing.4
I. An exhaustive account of law enforcement technology is given in A. W rMIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 67-325 (1970). See generally S. DASH, R. KNOWLTON & R. SCHWARTZ,
THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959) [hereinafter cited as DASH].
2. The challenges of technology to the Fourth Amendment were eloquently articulated
by Justice Brandeis in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
474 (1928):
"[1n the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be." The progress of science in furnishing the Government
with means of espionage is not likely to stop .... Ways may some day be developed
by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the
most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences
may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can
it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security?
3. This form of bugging is briefly described in United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859,
861 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.
1976); and 29 VAND. L. REV. 514, 514 n.5 (1976). For more detailed, but somewhat dated,
descriptions, see DASH, supra note 1, at 379; A. VESTIN, supra note 1, at 69-70; and Note,
Anthropoteleinetry: Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine, 80 HARV. L. REV. 403, 403 (1966).
Beepers have a sufficiently broad range to be monitored by airplane. See, e.g., United
States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by an equally divided
court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 802 (W.D.
Okla. 1976). In addition to tracking location, a beeper may be used to determine when
the item to which it has been attached has been disturbed. See United States v. Emery,
542 F.2d 887, 888-89 (Ist Cir. 1976). Tracking devices may have uses in contexts other than
criminal investigation, particularly in the area of probation and parole. See Fried,
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 475-76, 489-93 (1968); Note, supra at 406, 408-19.
4. The view that visual observation does not infringe on Fourth Amendment rights
rests in part on the famous dictum by Lord Camden that "the eye cannot . . . be
1461
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1461, 1977
Recently several federal and state courts have been asked to decide
whether electronic tracking, like electronic eavesdropping, incurs the
full panoply of Fourth Amendment protections or, like traditional
tailing, needs no judicial supervision.5 Their responses, often in con-
flict with one another, have failed to grasp or resolve the complex
problems presented by this issue.
This Note explores the constitutional implications of electronic
tracking. It first examines the inconsistent judicial decisions regard-
ing the beeper and suggests that they result from a misapprehension
of the controlling standards set in Katz v. United States.0 Instead of
relying on the majority opinion in Katz, the courts have applied the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard suggested in a concurring
opinion. 7 The Note attempts to resolve the Fourth Amendment issues
guilty of a trespass." Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 1066 (1965) (quoted in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)). Exemption from Fourth Amendment pur-
view has been extended to the other senses as well, and to devices, such as searchlights or
binoculars, that aid the senses. See Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right
to Privacy: Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REV. 75, 97 n.93 (1976).
5. Nine reported federal cases have dealt directly with the Fourth Amendment issue.
United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S.
June 6, 1977); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d
32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976); United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 823 (1977); United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1975), afl'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976); United States v. French, 414 F.
Supp. 800 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
In several other federal cases, the record has indicated that beepers were used, but
the courts have found it unnecessary to consider the search and seizure implications of
electronic tracking. See United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275, 1281 (5th Cir. 1977),
petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3696 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1977) (No. 76-1298) (beeper placed
in defendant's aircraft malfunctioned, so information was not tainted); United States v.
Park, 531 F.2d 754, 763-65 (5th Cir. 1976) (trial court did not err in refusing hearing on
use of beeper where government disclaimed use in this case although it had placed
beeper on defendant's car in conjunction with another investigation); United States V.
Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 133 (1976) (use of beeper inserted
in money bag to tail bank robbers legal under state "close pursuit" statute); United
States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1323, 1337-38 (D. Del. 1976) (even if beeper attached to
defendant's car was illegal, subsequent search and arrest not tainted because based on
information obtained by other means).
There have been at least three state court cases dealing with beepers. Houlihan v.
State, 21 CRim. L. REP. (BNA) 2315 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 1977) (placing beeper
on van loaned to marijuana trafficker by undercover agent not violative of Fourth
Amendment; alternatively, beeper not essential to investigation leading to arrest and
conviction); People v. Smith, 36 Cal. Rptr. 764, 771-73 (Ct. App. 1977) (placing beeper
behind dashboard of private airplane violated Fourth Amendment although airplane
operator could anticipate surveillance by radar); Fotianos v. State, 329 So. 2d 397 (Fla.
App. 1976) (even if use of beeper illegal, seizure of marijuana from defendant's vehicle
not tainted because visual surveillance was maintained at all times).
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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raised by electronic tracking through an interpretation of Katz that
avoids some of the pitfalls of the reasonable expectation of privacy
test. It argues that in most situations the physical attachment of the
beeper brings electronic tracking within the Fourth Amendment, and
that even where attachment is permissible, monitoring the beeper
may intrude on protected rights of privacy.
Although in some cases electronic tracking may be excepted from
warrant requirements, in most situations a warrant should be obliga-
tory. Furthermore, because the beeper, like the wiretap, has special
characteristics of duration, continuity, and secrecy not shared by
ordinary physical searches, the warrants issued for beepers should meet
special requirements necessary to ensure adequate cause and partic-
ularity. To this end, the Note proposes that warrant procedures
tailored to the beeper's characteristics be prescribed by statute.
I. The Beeper Cases
A brief description of facts and holdings of recent cases involving the
beepers reveals the complexity of the problems to be resolved. Beepers
have been used (primarily in drug investigations) 9 to trace the move-
ment of subjects on private property, along public thoroughfares, or
in public airways.10 Police have attached beepers to contraband drugs
discovered during border searches," to motor vehicles used by sus-
pects,'12 to packages or drums of chemicals,' 3 to airplanes,' 4 and to an
item of personal property.'3
Occasionally police have used more than one beeper in a single
8. See note 5 supra (citing cases).
9. All the cases discussed in this Note involved drug enforcement except United
States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 823 (1977), in which
a beeper was used to track an extortioner.
10. E.g., United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(ainvays); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
533 (1976) (highways); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1337, 1339 (D. Mass.
1976) (highways and private property).
11. United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. French,
414 F. Supp. 800, 801-03 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
12. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533
(1976); United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1323 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 823 (1977); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1975), afj'd en bane
by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
13. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533
(1976); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1335-36 (D. Mass. 1976).
14. United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3788
(U.S. June 6, 1977); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam).
15. United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846
(1976) (television set).
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investigation,' 6 and in several cases beepers have supplemented visual
tailing. 7 The length of tracking operations has ranged from a few
hours to several weeks.' 8 Tracking has often covered long distances; in
one case the tracking operation crossed three state lines.19 Whatever
the distance or duration of the tracking, the beepers have eventually
come to rest on private property.20
In nearly every case, those attaching the beeper have done so with-
out obtaining a search warrant.21 Most but not all courts have per-
mitted this warrantless use. The specific holdings, however, have
ranged from broad permission for warrantless electronic tracking in
almost any situation 22 to equally broad proscription;23 between these
extremes several courts have adopted narrow grounds permitting
warrantless use of beepers in limited situations such as tracking of
contraband 2 4 or under various standard exceptions to the warrant
16. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533
(1976); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Stipp. 1334, 1336 (D. Mass. 1976).
17. United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United
States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976); United
States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976); United
States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by an equally divided
court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (D.
Mass. 1976); United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 802 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Fotianos v.
State, 329 So. 2d 397 (Fla. App. 1976).
18. Compare United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1323 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 823 (1977) (beeper operated from 6:30 P.M. to 3.30 P.M. following day) with
United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976) (one
beeper operated continuously for a month).
19. United States v. French, 414 F. Snpp. 800, 801-02 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (suspects
followed from Oklahoma to Arkansas and through Kansas to Colorado). See United
States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591, 591-92 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S.
June 6, 1977) (tracking of airplane from Florida to Bahamas); United States v. Pretzinger,
542 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (airplane followed from Tucson, Arizona to
Mexico and back to Buckeye, Arizona); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861-62 (5th
Cir. 1975), aff'd en bane by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (track-
ing from Gainesville, Florida to a point 60 miles east).
20. E.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533
(1976) (bugged chemical drum taken into private rented garage); United States v.
Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 1975), ajf'd en bane by an equally divided court, 537
F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (bugged van driven onto private farm).
21. A warrant was obtained prior to placement of the beeper in United States v.
Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), although the court held that
this precaution was unnecessary. A warrant was obtained for placement of the second of
two beepers in United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
533 (1976).
22. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533
(1976).
23. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1975), ajf'd en bane by an
equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F.
Supp. 1334, 1338-39 (D. Mass. 1976).
24. United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90 & n.6 (1st Cir. 1976); United States
v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976) (warrantless track-
ing of illegally obtained goods; validity assumed without deciding); United States V.
French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
1464
Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment
requirement. 2a In reaching their holdings, the courts have examined
one or both of the two stages of a beeper's use: attachment of the
beeper, and monitoring of its location. Each has been viewed as a
potential infringement of Fourth Amendment rights. 26
A. Attachment
Courts have differed concerning the degree to which the attachment
of a beeper to private property implicates the Fourth Amendment.
2 7
One approach scrutinizes the circumstances surrounding the attach-
ment: if the installation of the beeper is legal, then its continuing
presence on the property does not impinge on Fourth Amendment
rights. 28 As a result, the strategy of installation may be important. For
25. United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 823 (1977) (automobile and hot pursuit exceptions); United States v. French, 414 F.
Supp. 800, 804 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (exigent circumstances). Exceptions to the warrant
requirement and their applicability to electronic tracking are discussed at pp. 1496-1502
infra.
26. Although most courts have noted the relevance of both attachment and monitoring
to Fourth Amendment analysis, not all courts have treated the two issues separately.
Compare United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
533 (1976) (attachment and monitoring issues subsumed under general question of rea-
sonable expectation of privacy) with United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803
OW.D. Okla. 1976) (explicitly separate treatment).
27. The courts agree that a physical intrusion prior to attachment invalidates the
entire process. See, e.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 533 (1976) (upholding placement of second beeper pursuant to court order:
"Had the agents not resorted to a warrant, entrance into the garage and the opening of
the truck's hood would have been an invasion of an area in which Hufford had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.")
In most of the cases decided thus far, however, the police legally gained access to the
property to which the beeper was attached. In most instances attachment occurred in a
public location. E.g., United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1323 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 823 (1977) (attachment to automobile occurred in hotel parking lot);
United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en bane by an equally
divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (attachment to van occurred while van parked
in public parking lot). Cf. United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888-89 (1st Cir. 1976)
(beeper attached during course of legal border search). But see People v. Smith, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 761, 767, 773 (Ct. App. 1977) (attachment of beeper behind airplane dashboard
violated owner's privacy). In other cases the police made the attachment on private prop-
erty to which they were admitted by consent. E.g., United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591,
591 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. June 6, 1977) (beeper attached to
airplane with owner's consent to track bailee's movements); United States v. Bobisink,
415 F. Supp. 1334, 1335-36 (D. Mass. 1976) (attachment to package of chemicals made at
plant with manufacturer's consent). For further discussion of consent and beeper searches,
see pp. 1485, 1489 & notes 116 & 138 infra.
28. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533
(1976) (attachment to drum of chemicals occurred with consent of chemical manufacturers
before delivery to defendants); United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976) (attachment to television traded by underco er agents for
drugs occurred when set was in rightful possession of police). Because in both cases the
beepers were attached before the property came into the defendants' possession, the
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example, if a beeper is legally placed on the property before it comes
into a suspect's possession, then the placement of the beeper remains
legal, even though attachment subsequent to acquisition might have
been an unreasonable search.
A second approach measures the intrusiveness of attachment accord-
ing to the nature of the item to which the beeper is attached. This
approach has been used to validate attachment of beepers to vehicles
on the theory that such property is subject to "lesser" expectations of
privacy, 29 and to contraband on the theory that the illegality of pos-
session eliminates privacy interests in the physical "security" of the
property.
30
A third approach holds that warrantless attachment of a beeper to
private property is a per se intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights.
The leading case for this position is United States v. Holmes.31 There
Hufford and Perez courts found that placement of the beepers did not intrude upon the
defendants' privacy. But see p. 1485 infra (arguing that attachment becomes search at
point of transfer to defendants).
29. United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1324 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
823 (1977). A similar view was approved in United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33-34
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976), and argued by the seven dissenters in United
States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc; per curiam) (Ainsworth,
J., dissenting). See United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (applying Hufford to airplanes). This argument rests on recent Supreme Court
decisions finding privacy interests in mobile vehicles to be of a constitutionally inferior
order. E.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). But see pp. 1487-88 infra (arguing
that Fourth Amendment status of automobiles does not justify warrantless attachment of
beepers to vehicles).
30. United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888-89 (Ist Cir. 1976); United States v.
French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1976). See note 131 infra (discussing Fourth
Amendment status of contraband).
31. 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d
227 (5th Cir. 1976). The court noted that beepers can be attached to persons as well as
property, and it expressed concern that this particularly intrusive use of the device
might become commonplace if attachments to property were not carefully restricted. Id.
at 866.
The sequence of decisions in Holmes deserves a brief explanation. On motions to
suppress evidence seized from a van owned by one defendant and from a farm owned
by two others, the district court held that warrantless use of a beeper violated the
Fourth Amendment, that all the evidence seized was a fruit of the search, and al-
ternatively that the evidence taken from the farm must also be suppressed because of an
illegal trespass by police. The district court did not consider whether all nine de-
fendants had standing to protest these searches because it erroneously believed this issue
to be conceded by the Government. Id. at 863-64. On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's rulings on the illegality of the two searches and the sup-
pression of evidence, but reversed on the issue of standing, determining that three
defendants lacked standing to challenge use of the beeper. Id. at 864, 867, 868, 870. At
the en bane rehearing, the appeal was argued de novo, and the court affirmed by equal
division the district court's conclusions with respect to the search and adopted by a
majority the panel's opinion with respect to standing. 537 F.2d at 227-28.
Thus the en banc decision effectively affirmed the result of the panel's decision con-
cerning the search and both the reasoning and the result of the panel's decision con-
cerning standing, although technically it was not an appeal from the panel decision. See
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the Fifth Circuit distinguished the attachment of a beeper from such
"minimal intrusions" as checking vehicle identification numbers and
taking paint scrapings: unlike these momentary intrusions, a beeper
remains constantly in place, performing a search of substantial dura-
tion and scope.3 2  Emphasizing the interrelationship between the
beeper's physical presence and its function, the court compared the
beeper to the presence of a hidden police officer.33 From this perspec-
tive not only the initial placement of the beeper but also its attach-
ment during the entire period of use is relevant to Fourth Amend-
ment inquiry. What begins as a legal search may subsequently become




The courts have also disagreed over the Fourth Amendment issues
raised when police monitor the movements of persons or property. At
one pole stands the view that electronic monitoring does not invade a
reasonable expectation of privacy when it tracks travel in public. For
example, in United States v. Hufford35 the Ninth Circuit held that an
individual who enters a public thoroughfare surrenders his right to
keep his movements, or those of property he takes with him, secret. It
found "no distinction" between an electronic monitor and visual
Western Pac. R.R. Case, 345 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1953) (rejecting suggestion that rehearing
en bane is a "'horizontal' appeal"); Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: Accomodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 563, 599
(1965) (rehearing en bane "fully reconsider[s the panel decision" but its effect is "to
supplant, rather than to reverse or affirm, the panel decision").
32. 521 F.2d at 864-65.
33. Id. at 865 n.11.
34. Id. at 868. A beeper's continuing presence on private property was also considered
relevant in United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-38 (D. Mass. 1976). The
court held that a beeper attached to a package before purchase by the defendants
violated their constitutional rights as soon as the package was received: "A citizen is
entitled to assume that property he buys does not contain an electronic spy." Id. at 1338.
Throughout the ensuing discussion, it should be noted that Holmes and Bobisink,
though still good law, may have been implicitly limited by subsequent decisions in
their respective circuits. See United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591, 592 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. June 6, 1977) (no Fourth Amendment violation
where legally effective consent to original installation of beeper on airplane; Holmes not
discussed); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976) (no Fourth Amendment
violation where beeper attached to contraband; Bobisink decision cited without discus-
sion); United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976) (no
Fourth Amendment violation where beeper attached prior to defendant's possession;
distinguishing Holmes prior to en bane affirmance); cf. Houlihan v. State, 21 CRiM. L.
RuP. (BNA) 2315 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 1977) (bugged van loaned by undercover
agent to suspected marijuana dealer did not violate Fourth Amendment; court found
Perez more applicable precedent than Holmes).
35. 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976).
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observation3" because the beeper only conveyed with precision in-
formation already available to the police without a warrant.3 7
The courts in Holmes and United States v. Bobisink3" took a com-
pletely contrary position, the Holmes court stating that although an
individual in public "can anticipate visual surveillance," he does not
thereby expose his location to electronic surveillance.3 9 These courts
identified several characteristics of electronic tracking that make it
more intrusive than visual observation, 40 including the physical attach-
ment of the beeper, the continuity and duration of monitoring,4 1 and
the capacity of a beeper to track location on private property as well
as in public. 42 The Holmes court also noted that an individual has no
way to protect himself from electronic monitoring.
4 3
Between these two poles is a middle ground occupied by several
cases involving beepers attached to contraband. In these cases the
courts took the position that the beeper maintains surveillance only
over the contraband itself; any tracking of individuals was treated as
incidental, uncoerced, and therefore irrelevant to Fourth Amendment
36. Id. at 34.
37. The court compared electronic tracking to the use of binoculars, tracking dogs,
and searchlights, all of which have been held to fall outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (searchlight); United States
v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976) (dogs); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968) (binoculars). In Sois, however, the court dif-
ferentiated sense enhancement devices from "sophisticated modern mechanical or elec-
tronic devices." 536 F.2d at 882. Moreover, in another "dog" case, United States v.
Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976), Judge Mansfield
distinguished between devices, such as electronic bugs, which replace the senses and
those, such as binoculars, which aid them. Id. at 464 (concurring opinion). See Peebles,
supra note 4, at 90-91.
38. 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976).
39. 521 F.2d at 866. See United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass.
1976).
40. 521 F.2d at 866 n.13 (tracking would not have been used but for its capacity to
convey information beyond the limits of visual observation); 415 F. Supp. at 1339 (elec-
tronic tracking "goes far beyond any ordinary powers of observation").
41. 521 F.2d at 866; 415 F. Supp. at 1339. In Bobisink, the court opined:
Presumably, no technological problem prevents agents from placing such devices on,
for example, a person's clothing. Thus, an individual could be traced on a moment
to moment basis as he went about his daily activities. It offends common sense to
suggest that such a continuous electronic surveillance would not violate any reason-
able expectation of privacy. To allow such indiscriminate monitoring could con-
ceivably be the prelude to sanctioning a "1984" network of such beepers connected
to a master monitoring station which would keep track of each of our movements
for the benefit of the powers that be. Certainly the average, reasonable citizen, with
his reasonable expectation of privacy, would take little solace in the fact that, while
his every movement was recorded, his conversations were not.
Id.
42. 521 F.2d at 868 (beeper invaded privacy of owners and occupants when taken onto
priiate farm); 415 F. Supp. at 1337, 1339 (beeper used to confirm whereabouts of
property secluded on private premises).
43. 521 F.2d at 865.
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considerations.4 4 Moreover, tracking limited to contraband was held
not to violate the Fourth Amendment because the illegal character of




II. A Search for Standards: Reinterpreting Katz
A. The Katz Majority and the Harlan Legacy
As every court considering the problem has recognized, determina-
tion of the beeper's Fourth Amendment implications depends on a
proper interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in Katz v.
United States.46 Katz modified a long line of cases that determined
the validity of searches and seizures by electronic surveillance primarily
by reference to property rights. 47 Before Katz, electronic interception
of oral communications was permitted so long as the techniques em-
ployed did not physically invade a "constitutionally protected area. '48
44. This view is most evident in United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D.
Okla. 1976). The court rejected the contention that the defendants' privacy of movement
was invaded: "[The beeper's] use in this case was for the purpose of tracking marijuana.
It was only coincidental that it came to rest in the particular truck and that [the
defendant] happened to be the driver. Its use was aimed not at keeping track of [the
defendant] or the trtck as such." Id. See United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90
(1st Cir. 1976) (beeper used to track parcel of drugs; concurrent tracking of persons not
considered); United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
846 (1976) (beeper attached to television set exchanged for drugs was monitored only to
identify property in manner similar to use of marked bills).
45. See United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889 (1st Cir. 1976) (tracking permissible
since item constructively seized at border); United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863
(5th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976) (monitoring a direct result of criminal
transaction).
46. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
47. See Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amnendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 968-78 (1968). Property, it should be
stressed, has never been the sole touchstone of Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme
Court recognized in the early case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), that the
principles of "constitutional liberty and security" on which the Fourth Amendment is
based "'apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employs of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." Chief among these fundamental
principles are "personal security, personal liberty and private property." Id. at 630.
48. The concept of constitutionally protected areas has its roots in the more rigid
"trespass" doctrine developed in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See
Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitutional Development from Olmstead to
Katz, 12 ST. Louis U.L. REV. 513, 516, 523-25, 526 (1968) (concept of constitutionally pro-
tected area developed to avoid overruling Olmstead). See generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 198-244 (1966). The emergence of the new concept
from the "trespass" doctrine can be traced in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954); and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). But see Clinton v. Virginia,
377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (per curiam) (Clark, J., concurring) (basing concurrence on
finding that trespass took place). For a sampling of the vigorous scholarly criticism the
1469
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1461, 1977
This approach proved to be inadequate, however, because it required
fine distinctions concerning the degree of "penetration" necessary to
cause a Fourth Amendment violation. Often the legal result turned
more on the type of device available to the police than on the effective
reach of the surveillance itself.49
Katz represents an extension of Fourth Amendment protection
beyond the limits of the doctrine of constitutionally protected areas.
The case involved electronic interception of telephone conversations
conducted from a public telephone booth. Litigation in the lower
courts and argument before the Supreme Court had debated whether
the surveillance involved physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area.5 0 The Court, however, departed from this standard on
the ground that it deflected attention from the real Fourth Amend-
ment issues at stake.51
Starting from the proposition that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,"5 2 the Court focused its inquiry on the defendant's
privacy rather than on location of the bug.5 3 The Court rejected
the theory that privacy interests must be bound to property rights.
54
It held that privacy may also inhere in intangibles, such as the de-
fendant's conversations, and that an individual may be entitled to
Fourth Amendment protections in public areas as well as in the
privacy of the home.
physical trespass doctrine received, see authorities cited in 13 VILL. L. Rav. 643, 644
nn.108-11 (1968).
The term "constitutionally protected area" was first used as a formal criterion in
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142-44 (1962). Rather than relying on strict concepts of
ownership, this approach attempted to accommodate privacy interests by analogizing them
to property rights. An area would be constitutionally protected, for example, if it
possessed characteristics similar to those of a house. See Kitch, Katz v. United States:
The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. C. REv. 132, 136; Note, supra note 47,
at 969-71.
49. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
See Dash, Katz- Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 296, 307-11 (1968).
One commentator has suggested that judicial reliance on property rights lasted as long
as it did primarily because Congress enacted legislation in 1934 to control the use of
wiretapping. Only as "bugging" devices that did not require interference with telephone
wires came into widespread use did the inadequacies of the Olmstead doctrine begin
to assume their full significance. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 48, at 205-06, 243-44.
50. 389 U.S. at 348-49. See Brief for Petitioner at 12-13, Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Brief for Respondent at 14-15, Katz v. United States, supra.
51. 389 U.S. at 350-51.
52. Id. at 351.
53. Id. at 350. The Court cautioned, however, that the Fourth Amendment does not
announce a "general constitutional 'right to privacy,'" that its protections may "go
further," and that they may "have nothing to do with privacy" in certain circum-
stances. Id.
54. Id. at 353.
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These considerations led the Court to articulate the following gen-
eral rule:
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.5
Applying this reasoning to the facts before it, the Court found that by
shutting the door to the booth and by paying for the call 56 the peti-
tioner had taken steps to exclude "the uninvited ear"; that he had
"justifiably relied" on the privacy of his conversations; and that he
was therefore "entitled" to protection from electronic surveillance.57
As a result, use of the bugging device represented "a 'search and
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 8
In applying Katz, lower courts have reduced its holding to a "reason-
able expectation of privacy" formula. Yet the phrase appears nowhere
in the Court's opinion. Rather, it is drawn from Justice Harlan's
concurrence, 9 which attempted to limit the majority's departure from
precedent and to inject personal intentions and social norms into the
determination of Fourth Amendment protection. Justice Harlan dis-
cerned in the prior cases a two-part test for determining the privacy
interests to which the Fourth Amendment extends: first, "a person
[must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy";60
and second, this expectation must be one "that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' "61 Although Justice Harlan agreed with the
majority that Fourth Amendment rights are personal, he argued that
to determine whether a particular privacy interest is deemed reason-
able by society generally requires "reference to a 'place.' "62 To expect
privacy for a conversation in an open field, for example, would in
Harlan's view have been "unreasonable."6 3 Indeed, surveillance of
Katz's conversations would not have been restricted by the Fourth
55. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 352.
57. Id. at 352, 353, 352. As further evidence of entitlement, the Court also mentioned
the "vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication." Id.
at 352.
58. Id. at 353.
59. Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 361. Harlan's test thus would deny Fourth Amendment protection where an
individual exhibits "no intention" to keep matters private. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 360, 361 (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).
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Amendment, Harlan intimated, without the physical manifestations of
privacy provided by the enclosed booth.
4
B. The "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy": A Critique
Although Justice Harlan's attempt to read the significance of phys-
ical location back into the Fourth Amendment's concept of privacy
has not entirely succeeded, 65 his test has survived. Most lower courts
apply the test as if it were controlling precedent, often without refer-
ence to the distinct rule of the majority opinion.6 When a Fourth
64. Harlan agreed with the majority because he found the petitioner's acts in shutting
the door and placing the call sufficient to create a "temporarily pri%ate place whose
momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reason-
able." Id. at 361.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 45 U.S.L.W. 4797, 4799 (U.S. June 21, 1977)
(personal belongings secured in locked trunk protected from warrantless search during
public transit); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) (plurality opinion of Black-
mun, J.) (travel in public does not waive Fourth Amendment protections); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (pedestrians on public street entitled to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion). Nonetheless, lower courts have frequently continued to limit Fourth Amendment
protection substantially to "constitutionally protected areas." See Note, Katz and the
Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's Home Is His
Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 63, 80-81 (1974) (citing cases) [hereinafter cited as Note, A
Man's Home Is His Fort]; Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United
States, A Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. Rev. 468, 471, 493-96 (1976) (citing cases). Both of the
preceding commentaries support the continuing relevance of "place" in balancing privacy
interests.
Harlan's view that conversations in open areas are not protected from electronic in-
terception was adopted by Congress in its wiretapping legislation. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)
(1970); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. COLL
CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2178.
66. No Supreme Court decision has ever explicitly adopted Harlan's test, although
the test has frequently been cited with approval. Perhaps the closest approach to formal
acceptance came in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the Court cited Katz for the
proposition that " 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,' and wherever an
individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' he is entitled to be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Id. at 9 (citations omitted). In United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), Justice White, writing for four members of the
Court, blended Justice Harlan's concept of "reasonable expectation" with the Katz
majority's concept of "justifiable reliance":
Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular defendants in
particular situations may be or the extent to which they may in fact have relied on
the discretion of their companions. . . . Our problem, in terms of the principles
announced in Katz, is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally "justifiable"
-what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant.
Id. at 751-52 (plurality opinion).
The "reasonable expectation" concept has been cited repeatedly by the Supreme Court
in a conclusory fashion. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 45 U.S.L.V.
4917, 4926 (U.S. June 28, 1977) (the "'pattern of de facto Presidential control" of personal
presidential papers and "congressional acquiescence" therein gave former President
Nixon a "legitimate expectation of privacy in such materials. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351-353 (1967)"); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) (plurality opinion
of Blackmun, J,) (taking of paint scraping from automobile not a Fourth Amendment
search: "we fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed"); United
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Amendment right is asserted, courts generally have inquired only
whether the facts of the case, taken as a whole, justified a "reasonable
expectation" that the matter sought to be preserved as private would
be protected from warrantless governmental intrusion.67
This use of the Harlan test produces confused and unprincipled
judicial decisions. The sole objective test for reasonableness suggested
by the formula is whether society as a whole would agree that the
matter in question should be considered "private." 68 Empirically, this
question may be difficult to answer. Courts must draw inferences from
social practices, and they must assess the social functions served by
specific privacy interests.09 From these general evaluations they must
then determine where, in specific instances, to draw the line beyond
which a warrant is required.
Two kinds of privacy interests are likely to be deemed "reasonable":
those that are commonly asserted, and those that, though less fre-
quently claimed, nevertheless play a significant role in the social
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (subpoena of voice exemplars by grand jury not a
search within Fourth Amendment because "[n]o person can have a reasonable expecta-
tion that others will not know the sound of his voice"); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 336 n.19 (1973) (by surrendering tax records to accountant defendant relinquished
"the necessary expectation of privacy to launch a valid Fourth Amendment claim").
67. See, e.g., United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 826 (1975) (expectation of privacy of an individual on his driveway "will generally
depend upon the nature of [his activities] and the degree of visibility from the street");
United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 1971) (expectation of privacy in
garage depends on number of people with access to garage, presence or absence of
windows, and proximity of garage to defendant's residence).
68. United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976) (question for Fourth
Amendment protection is "the kind of intrusion a free society is willing to tolerate");
United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932
(1974) ("what society recognizes as a reasonable expectation of privacy is restricted when
the individual asserting the expectation is incarcerated"); United States v. Vilhotti, 323
F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 452 F.2d
1186 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972) & 406 U.S. 947 (1972) ("to ascertain
what constitutes an unreasonable search the court must evaluate a person's efforts to
insure the privacy of an area or actixity in view of both contemporary norms of social
conduct and the imperatives of a viable democratic society"); cf. United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (quoted at note 66 supra).
The relationship between reasonable expectations of privacy and societal norms is dis-
cussed in Kitch, supra note 48, at 141-42, 150-52.
69. Justice Harlan himself later noted the significance of social values as a determinant
of Fourth Amendment protection under his test:
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or
legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume,
are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values
of the past and present.
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and. reflect,
we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examin-
ing the desirability of saddling them upon society.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
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order.70 Both the prevalence and the importance of privacy interests,
however, are inevitably matters of degree. Thus, the "reasonable ex-
pectation" standard compels courts to decide the degree of social
solidarity or significance sufficient to raise a Fourth Amendment claim.
For this decision the test applies no objective referent. Instead, courts
tend to weigh particular privacy interests against other values, such
as the need for effective law enforcement. 71 The weights assigned to
each competing value ultimately depend upon the judges' own prin-
ciples and priorities. As the judges' own values vary, so does the scope
of the Fourth Amendment.
By placing the Fourth Amendment on such an indefinite and
relativistic foundation, the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
permits constriction of the Amendment's protections. Even where
privacy has clearly been invaded, courts may be tempted to abandon
the warrant requirement and to permit warrantless searches on the
basis of ad hoc comparisons between the strength of the pertinent
privacy interests and the needs of law enforcement.72 In striking such
a balance, courts may view the reasonableness of the privacy claim
70. Telephone conversations provide a good example of a frequently exercised form
of privacy. The lawyer-client privilege exemplifies a less common form of privacy, but
one that is nonetheless regarded as highly important.
71. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377-78 (1976) (Powell, J., con-
curring) ("Resolution of this question requires a weighing of the governmental and
societal interests advanced to justify such intrusion against the constitutionally protected
interest of the individual citizen in the privacy of his effects.") The introduction of a
balancing approach to Fourth Amendment values predates Katz. See Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66
(1950), overruled on other grounds, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Greenberg,
The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of
Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1011, 1016 (1973).
What distinguishes balancing under the "reasonable expectation of privacy" formula
from its pre-Katz antecedents is that the former may be employed to determine the
scope of the Amendment as well as the degree of protection that it affords. Previous uses
of balancing attempted to answer the more limited question whether, under certain cir-
cumstances, the needs of law enforcement justified relaxing probable cause and warrant
requirements for matters undeniably within the Amendment's reach. That form of
balancing continues, see pp. 1496-97 infra, but in addition courts may now consider the
needs of law enforcement and other matters of social policy at the more fundamental
level of determining whether a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment has occurred at all. See Kitch, supra note 48, at 139-40; Case Comment, Elec-
tronic Eavesdropping and the Right to Privacy, 52 B.U. L. REv. 831, 838-39 (1972); The
Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 93, 192-94 (1968).
72. Compare United States v. Montgomery, No. 75-1715, majority slip op. at 22 (D.C.
Cir. May 26, 1977) (any decision finding warrantless search to be "an unlawful intrusion
on privacy" invites complaint of "unreasonable interference with police officers who
were only acting reasonably in coping with criminals") with id., dissenting slip op. at
6, 9-10 (enforcement of probable cause and reasonableness requirements by exclusion of
evidence on "hypertechnicalities" debilitates law enforcement efforts) (Wilkey, J.).
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merely as an inverse function of the reasonableness of the search.7 3
Where a search is deemed reasonable, countervailing privacy values,
even if commonly held or socially significant, may be considered in-
sufficient to require strict adherence to constitutional protections. 74
Furthermore, as Professor Amsterdam has noted, social "expecta-
tions" of privacy are subject to governmental manipulation. 73 By in-
forming the public that warrantless searches would henceforth be the
norm, the government could alter public perceptions of "reasonable"
privacy interests and thereby remove almost any investigation from the
reach of the Fourth Amendment.76 Thus, as Amsterdam observes, the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" approach converts the Fourth
Amendment into a social "Rorschach blot."
77
Erosion of Fourth Amendment protections is particularly likely
under the "reasonable expectation of privacy" approach because it
balances an indeterminate personal value against a recognized govern-
mental interest. An individual bears the burden of proving that his
privacy expectations are "reasonable," that is, that they are recognized
by society at large.78 But because privacy interests may be difficult to
73. The Supreme Court warned against this type of approach in Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969):
It is argued in the present case that it is "reasonable" to search a man's house when
he is arrested in it. But that argument is founded on little more than a subjective
view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on con-
siderations releant to Fourth Amcndmcnt interests. Under such an unconfined
analysis, Fourth Amendment protection ... would approach the evaporation point.
Id. at 764-65.
74. See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 945, 981 (1977) (noting that in
recent cases, "the Court has declared some systematic searches ... to be subject at most
to ad hoc reasonableness scrutiny on the assumption that foreseeable and 'minor' intru-
sions are unimportant and inoffensive to innocent people") (citations omitted).
75. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384
(1974).
76. Indeed, recently created exceptions to the warrant requirement suggest that cer-
tain expectations are being manipulated already. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976) (warrantless inventory search of automobile upheld in part on
grounds that public expects law enforcement officials to come into frequent contact
with motor vehicles and that car owner had been placed on notice by street signs warn-
ing that autos might be towed); note 162 infra. But see United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d
893, 905 n.30 (9th Cir. 1973) (court observed that a homeowner's right to Fourth Amend-
ment protection of his home would not evaporate merely because he was under mistaken
supposition that government could enter when it pleased).
77. Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 375. See United States v. Johnson, 20 CRIM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2367, 2369 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1977) (en banc) (MacKinnon, J., concurring) ("tT]he
problem is not solved simply by invoking the [reasonable expectation of privacy] rule in
Katz. That rule incorporates a fair amount of circularity. One will have a reasonable
expectation of privacy over those areas that courts tell him he may reasonably expect to
be private.")
78. See Note, A Mat's Home Is His Fort, supra note 65, at 76-77.
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define79 and are generally raised by those who stand convicted of
crime, it is both easy and psychologically appealing to minimize the
"costs" to society of permitting a warrantless search. Only the guilty
appear to be affected, and an expectation of privacy for the purpose of
concealing crime seems patently "unreasonable."8
The dangers inherent in the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard are exemplified by judicial analysis of electronic tracking.
Judges have approved warrantless electronic tracking in some cases on
the grounds that the privacy interests affected by the beeper were
relatively insignificant, that the beeper intrusions were justified by the
needs of law enforcement, or that the criminal activities monitored
were not subject to reasonable privacy expectations. 8' Although Katz
was formulated to accommodate the Fourth Amendment to tech-
nological development, the very novelty of beeper technology makes
it difficult to determine what privacy interests society would recognize
as "reasonable." Often courts rely on little more than their own value
judgments to sustain the conclusion that electronic tracking either
does or does not intrude upon "reasonable" expectations of privacy. "
79. Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, in PRIVACY 1, 1-4 (NOMOS XIII
J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV.
275, 275-76 (1974); Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEIP.
PROB. 281, 281 (1966).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 159-60 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 996 (1975) (defendants challenging constitutionality of statutory wiretap could not
complain of wiretap's intrusions beyond scope of legitimate police interest because they
brought invasion on selves by mixing personal lives and criminal activities); United
States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1202, 1206 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974)
(where appellants had gained entry to stranger's apartment by false representations and
had made prior "suspicious" visits, electronic surveillance invaded no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy: "Under the circumstances appellants may be held to have assumed
that their activities might be monitored."); cf. Note, supra note 74, at 980-85 (balancing ap-
proach to Fourth Amendment protections of privacy has led to relaxation of standards as
result of "premium" placed by courts on effective law enforcement). But cf. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (notes that Fourth Amend-
ment protection cannot vary for different substantive offenses); United States v. Mont-
gomery, No. 75-1715, majority slip op. at 22-23 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 1977) (dictum) (argu-
ment that government searches only criminals neglects fact that searches of innocent
persons seldom litigated because charges never brought).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
533 (1976) (privacy interests insignificant); United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1325-26
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 823 (1977) (Ross, J., concurring) (same); United
States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227, 228-30 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc; per curiam) (Ainsworth,
J., dissenting) (privacy interests insignificant; intrusions justified); United States v.
French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803-04 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (criminal activities not subject to
reasonable expectation of privacy). Similar arguments were expressly rejected in United
States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en bane by an equally divided
court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (affected privacy interests significant; law enforcement
needs not compelling); and United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1340 (D. Mass.
1976) (affected privacy interests significant).
82. For examples of conclusory reasoning, see United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859,
866 (5th Cir. 1975), afj'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.
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Moreover, the courts' value judgments themselves are in conflict, as
each court has pegged the privacy values affected by the beeper at a
different level on a sliding scale of Fourth Amendment protections.s3
C. Minimizing the Confusion: Some Limiting Principles in Katz
To some extent, the confusion over the Fourth Amendment status of
the beeper is unavoidable so long as privacy remains the central theo-
retical focus of Fourth Amendment analysis.8 4 Privacy, like most con-
cepts of fundamental value, is a relative, indeterminate concept that is
not easily converted into a workable legal standard. 5 As Justice
Stewart has observed, there is no "trick of logic" that will clarify
Fourth Amendment privacy analysis.80 But a return to the standards
articulated by the majority in Katz would alleviate the confusion and
impose some structure on an otherwise amorphous "Rorschach blot."
Scrutiny of the majority opinion in Katz suggests two limiting
principles that should guide Fourth Amendment privacy analysis. First,
Katz implies that a privacy approach should not be employed where
Fourth Amendment protection can be grounded in traditional prop-
erty rights analysis. Second, where a property-oriented approach does
not afford Fourth Amendment protection, Katz confines the scope of
privacy analysis by concentrating on: (a) the means employed by the
1976) ("A person has a right to expect that when he drives his car into the street, the
police will not attach an electronic surveillance device to his car in order to track
him."); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976) ("Surely a
person's movements constitute an area where he should be able to have some expecta-
tion of privacy .... [H]e can anticipate that he might be observed by someone following
him. But it is something else entirely to have one's whereabouts monitored continuously
by an undisclosed bug. [The beeper] goes far beyond any ordinary powers of observation
about which citizens are reasonably put on notice."); United States v. French, 414 F.
Supp. 800, 803-04 (W.D. Okla. 1976) ("What expectation of privacy was here infringed-
did [the defendant] have a reasonable expectation that he could secret marijuana and
not be observed? . . . Clearly viewed there is not implicated here any claimed right to
maintain the privacy of one's personal movements and locations.")
83. See pp. 1464-65 supra.
84. To resolve the difficulties that he identifies in the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard, Professor Amsterdam proposes what amounts to a departure from
privacy analysis altogether. He suggests a new constitutional requirement that would
permit searches only when conducted in compliance with legislative directives or
judicially approved police regulations. This requirement would apply to all searches,
including those excepted from warrant procedures. Professor Amsterdam argues that such
a rule would relieve the pressure on the courts to create post hoc exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Standard operating procedures would help law enforcement agencies
to reduce the variability of their practices and at the same time would provide more
durable safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure activity. Amsterdam, supra
note 75, at 416-20.
85. A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 25 (1971). See Freund, Privacy: One Concept
or Many, in PRIVACY, supra note 79, at 182, 183-84; note 79 supra (citing commentators).
86. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
J.).
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claimant to preserve his privacy, and (b) the effectiveness of those
means in preserving the claimant's privacy vis-4-vis the public at
largeY.'
1. The Security of Private Property
The first of these limiting principles has the character of a nega-
tive pregnant in the Katz majority opinion. The Court's refusal to be
bound by the strict limitations of property rights analysis was not a
disavowal of the important protections afforded by this traditional
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that the
concept of a " 'constitutionally protected area' " does not "necessarily"
provide an adequate index of the Fourth Amendment's scope. 8 But
the decision did not signal a retreat from the position adopted in
Silverman v. United States 9 that any physical intrusion on property
protected in terms by the Fourth Amendment may constitute a
search. 90 Rather, Katz recognized by reservation what the Court later
reaffirmed in Alderman v. United States:91 the Fourth Amendment
protects property as well as privacy. 92 Katz developed privacy analysis
as a supplementary standard, to be used only where traditional prop-
erty analysis proves inadequate.
93
87. In addition to the two limiting principles presented here, Justice Douglas insisted
that another principle exists, which affords absolute protection against searches and
seizures of certain objects, with or without a warrant. He included in this category
personal papers and private written communications. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
321 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
89. 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) (warrantless electronic eavesdropping equipment mak-
ing physical contact with heating duct in party wall violated Fourth Amendment).
90. Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 385. Cf. United States v. Wlite, 401 U.S. 745, 756
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (argues for "strict construction" of Fourth Amendment
with respect to constitutionally protected areas).
91. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
92. Id. at 175, 179-80. As Judge Goldberg commented in United States v. Hunt, 505
F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975):
[A]lthough the right of privacy has been the major theme of modern Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, the property rights rationale cannot be ignored altogether.
Perhaps it would not be too much to say that the continuing concern with property
rights is prompted by the realization that an individual often has a very reasonable
expectation of privacy in his private property, and that it is this expectation which
the Fourth Amendment protects.
Id. at 937 (footnote omitted). See United States v. Johnson, 20 CRIm. L. REP. (BNA) 2367,
2370 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1977) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (protection of private
property against trespass forms "bedrock" of Fourth Amendment on which Katz privacy
concepts expand). But see United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647 n.l (5th Cir. 1970)
(denial of absolute Fourth Amendment protection for property rights necessary so that
reasonable expectation of privacy test may be "allowed its full scope").
93. Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 385. See 32 ALB. L. REV. 455, 460-61 (1968). Pro-
fessor Weinreb suggests an approach that up to a point parallels the one proposed in
this Note. He posits two varieties of privacy: privacy of place, which would inhere in
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Katz suggests that privacy analysis should replace the traditional
property approach in two situations: where the government uses "non-
physical" methods of search 94 and where the pertinent privacy interests
themselves lack physical characteristics. In the case of a nonphysical
search that penetrates the physical barriers of a constitutionally pro-
tected area, the scope of Fourth Amendment protection is defined by
the area itself,95 and the privacy inquiry serves the narrow purpose of
determining whether an invasion has in fact occurred. Katz stands for
the proposition that under these circumstances an invasion of Fourth
Amendment rights does not depend on the "presence or absence of a
physical intrusion," 96 but occurs whenever the functional effect of the
government's investigation is to gain access to matters otherwise pro-
tected.97
Where Fourth Amendment protection does not emanate from any
tangible property interest, the scope of judicial inquiry broadens. It
becomes necessary first to decide whether a cognizable privacy interest
exists at all, and then to decide whether such an interest has been
invaded. Only at this point does an analysis based on property rights
become entirely inapposite. Thus, if the police had placed a bug on
Katz's house9s or if they had seized written communications rather
than oral ones,99 violation of physical privacy would have been ob-
vious, and judicial search for a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
would have been superfluous. But because evidence of such a physical
property, and privacy of presence. Although Professor Weinreb would thus distinguish
property analysis from privacy analysis, he would continue to frame both in terms of
personal "expectations." Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHi. L.
REv. 47, 53.54 (1974). Such an approach would not eliminate the ambiguity present in
the "reasonable expectation" standard.
94. Of course, even electronic surveillance uses "physical" means of detection in the
sense that its operation is governed by principles of physical science. The term em-
ployed here is intended to signify invasions that work no physical alteration on their
object, at least not one immediately perceptible to the senses.
95. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1969) (electronic sur-
veillance of an individual's telephone violates Fourth Amendment protection of his
home even if monitoring limited to conversations by third parties).
96. 389 U.S. at 353.
97. This implication of Katz flows from the context of the decision itself. Had there
been a clear physical invasion of property protected in terms by the Fourth Amend-
ment, existing doctrine would have established a search, and there would have been no
need to attempt a new rationale. Only because these elements were not present did it
become clear that the presence or absence of a physical intrusion would not be determi-
native of the case before the Court. See pp. 1470-71 supra.
98. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 177-78 (1969) (dictum).
99. See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (letters and sealed packages in
the mail protected from warrantless search or seizure by Fourth Amendment). But see
United States v. Ramsey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4577 (U.S. June 6, 1977) (international mail may
be searched without warrant upon entry into United States).
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search and seizure was lacking the Court found it necessary to pursue
its inquiry to a more subtle level.
By retaining explicit Fourth Amendment protection for property,
this interpretation of Katz serves a useful purpose. The physical char-
acteristics of property, apparent to both policeman and private citizen,
confer on Fourth Amendment analysis a degree of specificity, clarity,
and concreteness. A legislature would find it more difficult to manip-
ulate property rights, and the Fourth Amendment rights defined by
them, than to manipulate privacy expectations. These considerations
argue for a Fourth Amendment analysis that looks to the prophylactic
protections afforded to property in such cases as Silverman before
invoking the more nebulous privacy concerns that resolved Katz.
2. The Preservation of Privacy
a. A Focus on Means
Where an analysis of privacy claims becomes necessary, Katz limits
its scope to a focus on the means actually used by the claimant to
protect his privacy, rather than on the claimant's intent or on the
social acceptability of his claim. Instead of asking whether Katz ex-
pected his telephone conversation to be private and whether that ex-
pectation comported with social norms, the Katz Court inquired
whether the petitioner had attempted to preserve his privacy, and
answered this query by considering the steps he had taken to effect
that purpose. Katz's choice of "what . . . to preserve as private" was
treated by the Court as a matter for self-determination.100 His con-
versations were protected by the Fourth Amendment not because
society values the privacy of telephone conversations, but because a
person who enters a public booth and closes the door has adopted a
means reasonably calculated to ensure that his particular conversations
will not reach an "uninvited ear." 101
This reading of Katz avoids the high level of abstraction inherent
in the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Instead of looking to the
general privacy interests of society as a whole, courts may concentrate
100. 389 U.S. at 351. Professor Amsterdam shares this interpretation of the decision.
Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 365.
101. 389 U.S. at 352. Although the Court referred to the "vital role" of the public
telephone in private communication, id., it treated this factor more as evidence that the
petitioner had adopted means calculated to effect his purpose than as a test for the
substantiality of his privacy interest. Social acceptance of tile means of preserving privacy
may be a useful index of the effectiveness of those means, but it must be carefully
distinguished from social acceptance or disapproval of the purposes those means arc
employed to serve. See pp. 1481-82 infra.
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on specific acts of an individual claimant. The Fourth Amendment
issue becomes not whether particular privacy interests themselves are
"prevalent" or "important," or whether, weighed against the needs of
law enforcement, they "'deserve" protection, but whether the steps an
individual takes to preserve his privacy are reasonably calculated to
achieve that purpose. 10 2
A means-oriented analysis also permits an individual to secure as
much or as little privacy as he desires by using means of obtaining
privacy frequently or not at all, according to his own discretion.
Society may not be prepared to recognize as reasonable the desire of a
Howard Hughes to achieve near-total seclusion, because most people
would neither expect nor desire so much privacy. But under the
principles of Katz, an eccentric recluse could protect his seclusion from
warrantless governmental invasion so long as he sought to obtain his
privacy by appropriate means.
b. Privacy and the Public: The Reasonably Curious Person
To determine whether a particular means of preserving privacy is
reasonably calculated to achieve that purpose, Katz considers the ef-
fectiveness of the means in preventing intrusions by the public at
large.' 03 In Katz the petitioner obviously failed to protect his con-
versations from governmental intrusion, but he adopted reasonable
means for protecting them from the "uninvited ear" of the curious
stranger. Because these conversations were private with respect to the
public at large, they were protected by the Fourth Amendment against
the government's "uninvited ear" as well. 04 Whether the petitioner
should have "expected" government surveillance was wholly irrele-
102. The emphasis on measures taken to preserve privacy has appeared in a number
of decisions following Katz, usually as a factor in determining whether the defendant
exhibited a proper "expectation" of privacy. See United States v. Chadwick, 45 U.S.L.W.
4797, 4800 (U.S. June 21, 1977) ("By placing personal effects inside a double-locked foot-
locker respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from
public examination."); United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 947 (1972) (leaving garage door ajar nine inches not a measure "cal-
culated" to preserve interior from visual search); United States v. Haden, 397 F.2d 460,
465 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1027 (1970) ("One who intends a conversation or
transaction to be private and takes reasonable steps to keep it private is protected from
governmental intrusion .... ") The emphasis on means has been used more to limit than
to expand the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. See Note, A Man's Home Is His
Fort, supra note 65, at 70-72, 75-77.
103. A similar interpretation was suggested in Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance
and Other Aided Observations: The Shrinking Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 11
CAL. W.L. REv. 505, 515, 523-24 (1975).
104. P. 1471 supra.
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vant.10 5 The only "risk" of exposure that the Court regarded as
significant in terms of Fourth Amendment protection was that mem-
bers of the public might overhear what was being said. Once this risk
was eliminated by shutting the door of the booth, the petitioner was
protected by the Constitution from additional actions the police might
take to discover his activities.
The Court's emphasis on means and on their effectiveness in secur-
ing privacy from the public at large leads to a workable standard for
determining Fourth Amendment protection. The government must
stand in the shoes of the public: it may see, know, and take without a
warrant only what members of the public may see, know, and take. So
long as an individual has protected his privacy against intrusion by
his fellow citizens, he may assume that he has also protected it against
governmental interference. Thus, his reliance on Fourth Amendment
protection is "justifiable" where the means he has employed to pre-
serve his privacy are calculated to be effective against reasonably curi-
ous members of the public at large.
Although the concept of the "reasonably curious person" may not
be defined with precision, its basic features may be sketched. A rea-
sonably curious person is, first, an individual with normal motives for
inquiring into others' affairs. He (or she) is neither a voyeur nor a
member of a class with unusually strong incentives for investigation
(such as business competitors or newspaper reporters). Second, a rea-
sonably curious person seeks to satisfy his curiosity by employing means
of discovery that other members of the public with similar motives
would be likely, as an empirical matter, to use. Such an individual
neither resorts to illegal methods nor uses means that, although legal,
are uncommon. Finally, the reasonably curious person may be pur-
poseful in his investigation, but only to the extent that normal
curiosity impels.
Defining Fourth Amendment protection in terms of the reasonably
curious person clarifies what the Court meant in Katz when it said
that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public" is not subject
to Fourth Amendment protection, but "what he seeks to preserve as
private . . . may be constitutionally protected."'' 10 To determine
whether a governmental investigation has intruded on Fourth Amend-
105. Indeed, had it considered the issue, the Court might very well have concluded
that such an expectation was reasonable, given the criminal nature of the petitioner's
activities. See Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 384 ("An actual, subjective expectation of
privacy obviously has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what
the fourth amendment protects.'")
106. 389 U.S. at 351-52 (emphasis supplied).
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ment rights, courts should inquire whether the fruits of the search
were matters that a reasonably curious person, using the ordinary
means of investigation at his disposal, might have discovered. Under
this test, items or information actively and "knowingly" exposed to
others do not receive constitutional protection, at least to the extent
of the exposure, since by definition such matters have been rendered
accessible to the public. 10 7 Likewise, when an individual makes no
effort to preserve something as private, so that any reasonably curious
member of the public may have access to it, then government agents
may obtain that same information without conducting a search. Even
if an individual attempts to preserve something as private, but does
so by means not reasonably calculated to achieve his purpose, his
negligent exposure of the matter in question defeats any claim to
constitutional protection.108 But if the means he chooses are designed
107. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), the Court upheld electronic
surveillance by use of a bugged informant, concluding that the electronic device only
picked up what was knowingly disclosed to the informant and therefore did not invade
a pri acy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. This decision, however, explicitly
rests on the fact that one party to the conversations, the informant, participated in the
surveillance. Id. at 749 (plurality opinion of White, J.). Justice White, writing for four
members of the Court, emphasized that the same information could have been obtained
by having the informant write out transcripts or reports after each conversation. Id. at
751.
This aspect of the Court's decision is consistent with the interpretation of Katz proposed
in this Note, because there was in fart disclosure to another member of the public, who
in turn conveyed the same information to the police. In Katz it was of course possible
that the other parties to the petitioner's conversations might have revealed them to the
government, but the White Court implied that only actual consent could have justified
the Katz bugging. See id. at 749 (distinguishing Katz); cf. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364, 369-70 (1968) (dictum) (fellow union officials might have given valid consent to
search of defendant's shared office but no such consent is claimed).
According to the standards proposed in this Note, however, the Court's decision in
White may be incorrect on another ground. Some of the monitored conversations took
place in the defendant's home and automobile by means of a bugging device concealed
on the person of the informant, who had been invited in as a guest. 401 U.S. at 747. It
is arguable that, although the informant could consent to disclosure of the conversations
that the defendant had shared with him, he could not validly consent to physical in-
trusion of the bug onto the defendant's private property. See Weinreb, supra note 93,
at 69; p. 1485 infra; cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921) (govern-
ment agent gaining entry as guest to defendant's home may not use invitation as occasion
for warrantless search). See generally Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping
& Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a
Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 189 (1968) (arguing on the basis of functional privacy
considerations for a result contrary to that subsequently reached in White); Case Com-
ment, supra note 71, at 841-47 (criticizing White).
108. Several courts have held that carelessness or inaction in protecting privacy is
sufficient to defeat a Fourth Amendment claim. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 472
F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973) (no expectation of privacy when
door of apartment left open); United States v. Fuller, 441 F.2d 755, 761 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971) (dictum) (eavesdropping on conversations in public permissible
if accomplished without electronic amplification). In some cases courts have characterized
careless exposure as "knowing exposure." Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir.
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to have the desired effect of protecting privacy against the public at
large, then those means are sufficient to raise constitutional protection
against governmental intrusion as well. 109
This interpretation of Katz does not insist that government in-
vestigators employ only those technologies that a reasonably curious
person might employ. But it does insist that the government, whether
its technology be simple or sophisticated, performs a Fourth Amend-
ment search whenever its investigation achieves results that a reason-
ably curious person could not achieve. Because the government may
intrude only to the extent that reasonably curious persons might
intrude, it cannot by unilateral action alter the scope of an in-
dividual's "justifiable reliance" on his privacy. That reliance depends
solely upon what other citizens might do, and upon the means the in-
dividual adopts to protect his affairs from public notice. 110
This approach does not eliminate the flexibility of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. It requires courts to make empirical judgments
concerning the nature of the reasonably curious person and the effec-
tiveness of means used to preserve privacy. These judgments, in turn,
allow some latitude in fixing the scope of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. But the degree of variability is more limited than that under
the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, because the judgments
required by the proposed approach concern conduct rather than ex-
pectations and values. Courts are called upon to measure the conduct
of the reasonably curious person against the conduct of persons at-
tempting to preserve their privacy. The circumstances of each case
bear more directly on these considerations than they do on determina-
tions of the privacy that society as a whole recognizes as reasonable.
The result is a more reliable and consistent standard for defining
Fourth Amendment protections than has been possible under Justice
Harlan's formula.
1969) (Fourth Amendment rights not violated when police looked through partly open
bathroom window); United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1032 (1969) ("conversations carried on in a tone of voice quite audible to a
person standing [in public hallway outside apartmcnt]" are not protected by Fourth
Amendment). See generally Note, A Man's Home Is His Fort, supra note 65, at 69-70
(citing cases).
109. Professor Amsterdam argues that the Fourth Amendment fails in its central
purpose if it requires individuals to protect their privacy by such stringent means that
they are prevented from leading normal lives. Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 402. One
commentator suggests that subsequent application of the reasonable expectation standard
has led to just that result. Note, A Man's Home Is His Fort, supra note 65, at 70-72. The
interpretation of Katz proposed in this Note responds to Professor Amsterdam's admoni-
tion by placing police on an equal footing with the public at large. Priiacy in one's
everyday affairs becomes the touchstone for privacy against warrantless governmental
intrusion.
110. Comment, supra note 103, at 515, 524.
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III. Katz in the Context of Beepers
A. Intrusion by Physical Presence
Recognizing the limitations on privacy analysis set by this interpreta-
tion of Katz facilitates understanding of the beeper's search and seizure
implications. In most situations, resort to privacy analysis should be
unnecessary, because placement of the beeper represents a physical
invasion of the security guaranteed to private property by the Fourth
Amendment. The beeper's physical invasion is unique. It converts
private property to a use-surveillance--unintended by the original
owner."1' Because the beeper serves as a surrogate police "presence,"
not only does its initial attachment involve an "actual trespass," 11 2 but
its continuing placement works a continuing violation of Fourth
Amendment rights. 1 3 Like an electronic voice monitor, the beeper
may thus offend the Fourth Amendment even when attached to an
exterior surface."
4
The clearest case of physical intrusion arises when the beeper is at-
tached without consent to property protected as an "effect" by the
Fourth Amendment. In such a case a search occurs at the moment of
contact. A search may also occur when a property owner consents to
the initial attachment but the property is subsequently transferred to
another individual whose movements the police wish to track."' Once
the property comes into the new owner's possession, the original
owner's consent is no longer effective, and the beeper's continuing
presence on the property violates the Fourth Amendment."16 Finally,
I11. Of course, the beeper does not physically detain or damage the property, but it
does convert it into a kind of "informant." See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859,
865 n.11 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.
1976) (finding "slight if any difference" between attached beeper and agent hidden in
trunk who tracks location of vehicle).
112. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1975), alf'd en bane by an
equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); see id. at 865 n.11, 866, 868 (suggesting
analogies between attached beeper and police presence).
113. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (prolonged period of electronic
surveillance is "equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures").
114. Compare Silverman v, United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (use of "spike
mike" making contact with heating duct in defendant's building is an "actual intrusion"
for Fourth Amendment purposes) with United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865 (5th
Cir. 1975), aj'd en bane by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
115. E.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533
(1976) (beeper attached to drum of caffeine prior to delivery to defendant purchaser);
United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976) (beeper
attached to television set transferred to defendants as part of illegal sale of heroin).
116. For consent to be effective, it is well established that a third party must either
have a right to "mutual use of the property" amounting to "joint access or control for
most purposes," United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974), or else a direct
grant of authority to make the consent, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488-90 (1964).
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even if attachment of the beeper is legally justified, a physical intru-
sion may occur when the item to which the beeper is attached is taken
onto real or personal private property. Again, the beeper interferes
with the security of the property on which it finally rests. Because it
goes where a law enforcement officer cannot go without violating the
Fourth Amendment, the beeper's location within a constitutionally
protected area results in a search."17
At least one court has attempted to minimize the significance of the
beeper's continuing presence by asserting that police are responsible
only for the initial attachment of a beeper, and that subsequent in-
trusions created by the beeper's physical presence are of an inad-
vertent character insufficient to create a Fourth Amendment claim.'18
Yet the police who install a beeper expect it to remain in place and to
follow the item to which it is attached wherever the item goes. Con-
sequently, police are as responsible for subsequent intrusions as they
are for the original attachment."19
Legal ownership alone is insufficient where actual control has been surrendered. See id.;
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961). In cases such as United States v.
Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976), and United States v.
Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 n.5 (D. Mass. 1976), drug manufacturers lacked the
capacity to consent to the placement of beepers on property after it had been transferred
to the defendant purchasers, since at that point the manufacturers maintained neither
mutual control nor rights of ownership. Indeed, in Hufford consent may have been in-
effective prior to transfer even though the company had control of the drum, because
the attachment occurred subsequent to payment of a deposit by one defendant, and the
company lacked both actual and implied authority to waive his constitutional rights. See
United States v. Martyniuk, 395 F. Supp. 42, 43 (D. Ore. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
533 (1976).
117. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en bane by
an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
118. United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1976). A similar con-
clusion appears to have been assumed in United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90 (Ist
Cir. 1976), and United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
846 (1976), where the courts considered only whether the initial attachment required a
warrant.
119. The contention that police are not responsible for post-attachment intrusions
seems to rest in part on notions of assumption of risk. Those engaged in criminal actihity,
it is urged, assume greater risks of surveillance than the average person; in this sense,
persons who deal in contraband or controlled substances bring governmental intrusions
upon themselves. See United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 846 (1976); United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 804 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
Application of assumption of risk principles to Fourth Amendment adjudication may
be inappropriate even tnder the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, as Justice
Harlan himself observed. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). To the extent such an approach is grounded in the Katz majority opinion
it is no more tenable, for it must rest on a distorted concept of "knowing exposure."
This approach views those engaged in criminal activity as chargeable with the knowl-
edge that their affairs are likely to become the object of secret government surieillance.
But this distorts the meaning of the knowing exposure concept, which emphasizes actual
exposure to the public. See pp. 1482-83 & note 107 supra. Because electronic tracking must
be secret to be effective, "exposure" to a beeper taken onto private property must be
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Because the beeper is small, because it does no apparent damage to
property, and because attachment does not wrest the property from
the owner or impede use in any apparent way, some courts have as-
serted that attachment, at least to a vehicle, is a "technical trespass" too
insignificant to require stringent Fourth Amendment restrictions. 20
This assertion rests on the contention, drawn from Cardwell v.
Lewis,121 that a beeper attached to an external surface exposed to
public contact does not invade any reasonable expectation of privacy.122
In Cardwell v. Lewis the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless seizure
of paint scrapings and tire castings from an automobile. Justice Black-
mun's plurality opinion argued that an automobile is subject to
"lesser" expectations of privacy than a dwelling because of its mobility,
its inability to escape public scrutiny, and its relatively rare use as a
repository for personal effects. For these reasons, the plurality treated
the physical intrusion involved in the case as de minimis and hence
not protected.
123
unknowing. Nor may the suspects be charged with "negligent" exposure in such a case,
since beeper intrusions would probably not be made by reasonably curious members of
the public. See pp. 1481-84 supra. The suspects would be "rightfully oblivious to the
risk" that their property might be invaded by a bug. Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 72
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
120. E.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
533 (1976) (attachment of beeper and presence on truck an intrusion inferior to entering
prilate garage or opening trunk hood); cf. United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647-48 (5th
Cir. 1970) (nonelectronic intrusions required for vehicle identification, though involving
a "technical trespass," are "outside any reasonable expectations of privacy"). But see
United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1335-36, 1338 (D. Mass. 1976) (rejecting
Government argument that beeper intrusion "does not come up to the level of a
'search' ").
121. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
122. Several beeper cases cite Cardwell v. Lewis in reaching the conclusion that
beepers are a minimal intrusion. See, e.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976) (due to lesser expectation of privacy in vehicles,
attachment and monitoring of beeper not within Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 823 (1977) (Ross, J.,
concurring) (the intrusion caused by a beeper, "if any can be said to exist, [is] decidedly
abstract and theoretical"); United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1976) (en
banc; per curiam) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting) (installation of beeper "only a minimal
intrusion"). But see United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1975), afJ'd
en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
123. 417 U.S. at 590-91. The Court's decision in Cardwell v. Lewis actually rested on
an interpretation of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment. See p. 1500 & note 171 infra. Four Justices agreed that individuals' low expecta-
tion of privacy in automobiles creates a distinction between mobile Nehicles and other
effects, see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970), rendering warrantless searches
or seizures of vehicles permissible where warrantless searches or seizures of more pro-
tected items would not be. 417 U.S. at 590-92 (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.). Their
rationale was thus predicated on the insignificance of the privacy interests involved as
well as on the insignificance of the intrusion. Justice Powell's deciding vote was cast on
the separate ground of his objection to habeas corpus relief where the petitioner had an
opportunity to litigate fully his Fourth Amendment claims in state court. Id. at 596
(Powell, J., concurring in the result).
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Regardless of the merits of this theory in its own context, 12 4 it
should not be extended to beepers. Attachment of a beeper is far from
a minimal intrusion. Searches permitted as minimal intrusions have
ordinarily involved brief physical examinations similar to those that
might arguably be expected from the public at large.'2 5 By contrast,
an attached beeper represents a lengthy physical intrusion that appro-
priates an item for an unintended use.' 2 6 A reasonably curious person
might peer into the windows of an automobile, inspect its tires, or even
look under its hood. 27 No reasonably curious person, however, would
attach a beeper to another person's car. Therefore, a car owner need
not act to protect his privacy against such an event.' 28
124. Cardwell v. Lewis has been criticized by several commentators. See, e.g., Note,
Confutsing the Confusion: Automobile Search and Seizure Takes a New Turn, 12 Hous.
L. REV. 460, 467-68 (1975) (noting difficulties of determining what parts of an automobile
are sufficiently "exterior" that they may be searched with impunity); Comment, Warrant-
less Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court From Carroll to
Cardwell: Inconsistently Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C. L. REv. 722, 742-47 (1975);
cf. Weinreb, supra note 93, at 75-76 (noting that contrary to assumption of automobile
exception, vehicles often serve as private repositories). The commentary has not altered
the Court's view. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (quoting
Cardwell v. Lewis's "lesser expectation" rationale with apparent approval).
125. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (intrusion from
border patrol roving checkpoint characterized as "limited" and "modest," lasting no
more than a minute); United States v. Sherriff, 546 F.2d 604, 607 (5th Cir. 1977) (close
visual examination of vehicles parked in private area open to the public does not invade
reasonable expectation of privacy); United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d
45, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1975) (photographing portion of auto's interior
in plain view involved some intrusion but no Fourth Amendment violation); United
States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 646-48 (5th Cir. 1970) (narrowly circumscribed auto inspec-
tion to determine vehicle identification number involved no more intrusion than that
to be normally expected from the public); United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441, 441
(5th Cir. 1970) (en banc; per curiam) (alternative holdings) (vehicle identification check
either not a search or else reasonable under the circumstances; intrusion "did not
violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers or effects").
126. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by
an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (contrasting attachment of beeper
with permissible intrusions of "limited scope, purpose and duration"); United States v.
Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976) (installation of beeper not a minimal
intrusion because it involves "actual trespass" into areas "under the umbrella of the
Fourth Amendment" and carries potential for significant invasions of privacy); cf. Note,
The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. Mit. J. L. REF. 154, 182 (1972)
("entry of . . .material objects under government control" such as bugging devices are
an offensive presence even apart from information-gathering activities).
127. See United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1970) (inspection of vehicle
identification numbers tinder hood, on doorpost, or on frame of automobile involves
only intrusions into parts of automobile often in "plain view" of "casual or purposeful
onlookers").
128. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc
by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); 29 VAND. L. REV. 514, 519-26
(1976). The Holmes court also noted that it is difficult, if not impossible, to protect one's
property against beepers. "[O]nce one leaves home and enters the public streets," there is
"no way to lock a door or place the car under a protective cloak as a signal to the
police that one considers the car private." 521 F.2d at 865. Cf. United States v. Portillo-
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Every reported case dealing with the Fourth Amendment implica-
tions of electronic tracking could have been decided by use of property
analysis. Beepers have, without consent, been either attached to private
property or taken onto private property. Despite the courts' frequently
contrary conclusions, the beeper's physical presence almost invariably
violated Fourth Amendment rights. In three cases the police did ob-
taift consent from third parties before attaching the beeper. In two of
these, however, the consents became ineffective when the property to
which the beepers were attached was transferred to the suspects' ex-
clusive control.129 In only one case did the original consenting party
retain an interest in the property sufficient to justify the beeper's con-
tinuing presence.'3 0 The cases in which beepers were attached to
contraband raise more difficult questions about the beepers' infringe-
ment of Fourth Amendment interests in the bugged objects.' 3 ' In
Reyes, 529 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 267 (1976) (insertion of
key into automobile door to check whether it fit was not minimal intrusion but "be-
ginning of the search").
129. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976);
United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976). See also People v. Smith,
136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding consent by rental agent ineffective for attach-
ment of beeper to rented airplane).
130. In United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3788 (U.S. June 6, 1977), an airplane was subject to joint ownership or control, so consent
for attachment of the beeper by either owner was effective. Id. at 592.
131. The degree to which contraband is protected by the Fourth Amendment is a
matter of some doubt. Following the analysis employed in this Note, this question must
be divided into two subsidiary issues: whether contraband may be an "effect" under the
Fourth Amendment and thus protected against physical intrusions, and whether it may
be secluded so that the privacy of its location and movement is preserved. For a discus-
sion of the latter issue, see note 147 infra.
Although searches for contraband were one of the chief pre-Revolutionary abuses of
search and seizure that the Framers endeavored to correct, Kaplan, Search and Seizure:
A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALiF. L. REV. 474, 475-76 (1961), the property
status of contraband under the Fourth Amendment has never been definitively de-
termined. In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53 (1951), the Court held that a
federal statute banning "property rights" in narcotics did not affect the possessor's
Fourth Amendment rights to protection from warrantless search and seizure. This hold-
ing, however, is limited by the facts of the case: it involved a warrantless search of
private quarters in which the contraband had been secluded and to which the defendant
was a frequent invitee. Thus, the Court's decision stands mainly for the proposition that
governmental interest in contraband does not reduce or eliminate property or privacy
interests independently protected by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Lisk,
522 F.2d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976) (opinion of Stevens,
J., on petition for rehearing) (interpreting Jeffers as holding that a seizure of contraband
violates Fourth Amendment rights if the claimant has property rights in the place being
searched or if the search is directed at him); cf. United States v. Connolly, 479 F.2d 930,
936 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 897 (1973) (warrantless search of defendant's
premises violated Fourth Amendment although police had reason to believe that contra-
band was stored on property).
The courts in some beeper cases have indicated that the contraband by itself is denied
any Fourth Amendment protection from physical intrusion. See United States v. Emery,
541 F.2d 887, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D.
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those cases, however, the beepers were subsequently taken onto private
property.132 The result was physical intrusion into a place to which
Fourth Amendment protections extend. Thus, in nearly every decided
beeper case, traditional property rights analysis should have led the
court to hold that the beeper's attachment was a physical invasion
resulting in a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
B. Intrusion by Monitoring
Only rarely should it be necessary to pursue analysis of search and
seizure questions raised by the beeper beyond the level of physical
intrusions. Nevertheless, there may be cases where property interests
fail to afford protection against surveillance by means of electronic
tracking devices. For the present, this problem is likely to arise pri-
marily in cases where defendants lack standing to object to the beeper's
Okla. 1976). Support for this position may be inferred from Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 299-300, 306-07 : n.11 (1967), which, in the process of eliminating the "mere
evidence" rule, stated that contraband may be seized without a warrant when encountered
during the course of an otherwise legal search. The support is ambiguous, however, for
under the circumstances this result was fully consistent with the exigency and plain
view exceptions to the warrant requirement, see pp. 1496-97 & note 161 infra. Moreover,
that the Court also permitted warrantless seizure of lawfully possessed effects supplying
evidence of crime signifies that its rationale did not depend on the property status of
the item seized. 387 U.S. at 306-07.
Precedent thus fails to resolve the issue of Fourth Amendment protection of contraband.
It should be noted, however, that excluding contraband from the class of effects pro-
tected from physical intrusion by the Fourth Amendment would involve a significant
departure from the established proposition that actual use and possession rather than
legal ownership form the source of Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (anyone legitimately on premises may challenge legality
of search if its fruits are introduced against him). Such a departure should at the very
least be strictly limited to circumstances where possession of the contraband itself con-
stitutes a crime. The assumption in United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976), that goods obtained by illegal means, but otherwise perfectly
innocent in character, are also stripped of property protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment ignores a tenet of the criminal justice system. It permits the police, rather
than the courts, to determine in the first instance what is and is not illegal, and to act
on that judgment by interfering with individual rights.
Where the item is presumptively of criminal character a warrant requirement for
attachment of beepers to the contraband is unlikely to impose undue burdens on law
enforcement. To attach the beeper, contraband must at some point come into the
possession of the police. When that occurs, there is unlikely to be any difficulty delaying
release of the contraband until a warrant for the beeper can be obtained. Indeed, if
such a delay were for some reason impossible, police would have a valid excuse for
dispensing with the warrant on grounds of "exigent circumstances." See pp. 1500-02 infra.
132. United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976) (apartment); United States
v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976) (property placed in
private automobile); United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (barn).
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attachment and physical presence.' 33 For example, a passenger in
another person's automobile might lack standing to object to a beeper's
physical presence, as might a guest or bailee if the property owner
consented to attachment. 34 Moreover, the history of electronic eaves-
dropping demonstrates the danger of resting protection entirely on
the notion of physical intrusion on private property.135 New tech-
nological developments may obviate the need for physical attachment
of a monitoring device, 36 making privacy rights a primary rather
than supplementary source of Fourth Amendment protection.
Where the physical presence of a beeper does not cause a physical
invasion proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, monitoring the
beeper's location and movement impermissibly intrudes on privacy
only if it conveys information that is not accessible to reasonably
curious members of the public. 37 If the beeper permits police to
133. To determine whether a search or seizure has occurred, it is sufficient to con-
sider whether use of the beeper violated someone's Fourth Amendment rights. Standing
goes to the narrower question of whether the search violated a particular defendant's
rights, so that evidence obtained as a "fruit" of the search cannot be introduced against
him at trial. See generally Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth
Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 421 (1975). The standing issues raised by use of the
beeper lie beyond the focus of this Note. The purpose of mentioning standing at this
juncture is simply to point up the need for privacy analysis in situations where no
property interest of the defendant is affected by the beeper's physical intrusion.
134. See United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591, 592 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. June 6, 1977); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir.
1975), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
135. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1961) (Douglas, J., con-
curring) (arguing that trespass doctrine rendered obsolete by technological advances that
allow bugging of person's premises without physical penetration).
136. Infrared cameras already enable investigators to detect the presence of persons
or objects concealed behind physical enclosures. Scintillators permit detection of certain
objects. See Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 2-3 (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc) (uphold-
ing on basis of pre.Katz trespass doctrine use of scintillator in public hallway to detect
radioactive matter in defendant's apartment).
137. The threshold question of what it is the beeper tracks has provoked some con-
flict. Two positions have emerged. One treats electronic tracking as a "'probing, ex-
ploratory quest for evidence of crime'" that amounts to a search whenever it provides
the government with information otherwise private. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d
859, 866 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.
1976) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970)). See United
States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-40 (D. Mass. 1976). A second position, implicit
in United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803-04 (W.D. Okla. 1976), is that the extent
of a search is determined by the government's purpose. In this view, if the government's
aim is only to track the movements of property, then information from the same
tracking operation concerning movements of persons comes into the government's hands
only incidentally and is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment issues. To the extent that this
latter view rests on an assessment of governmental intent, it conflicts with Katz, which
defines Fourth Amendment search and seizure in terms of actual invasions of an in-
dividual's privacy, and not in terms of those "invasions" that serve the government's
purpose. 389 U.S. at 353. "IT]he essence of a search is the gathering of nonpublic in-
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"see" only what reasonably curious persons might see, it reveals only
information that has been knowingly or carelessly exposed to the
public. Such information is subject to search without a warrant by
any method that is otherwise legal.
The problem with electronic tracking, however, is that the purview
of the beeper is not so narrowly confined. The beeper has the capacity
to obtain information about location and movement despite their ef-
fective concealment from the public at large. Indeed, it is precisely to
exploit this capacity that the beeper is used.
To decide whether the use of a beeper impairs privacy rights pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment, courts must inquire whether the
subject has sought to protect location and movement from view,
and whether information conveyed by the beeper exceeds that ac-
cessible by visual observation. 138 Because this determination depends
formation," regardless of whether the gathering is planned or accidental. Note, supra
note 47, at 974.
The French opinion raises the related issue of when a beeper can be said to be track-
ing the location or movement of persons. No reported case has involved direct attachment
of a beeper to a person or his immediate effects. The prospect that beepers might be
attached directly to persons has, however, been one reason that courts have given for
imposing warrant requirements on beeper searches. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d
859, 866 (5th Cir. 1975), afj'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.
1976); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976).
Beepers have, however, been attached to property subject to the control of particular
individuals in order to monitor the location and movement of those individuals. The
congruence between the movement of property and that of persons in these cases, together
with the evident purpose of the police investigation, belies any attempt to distinguish
monitoring the object from monitoring the individual. Probably the clearest example of
tracking persons occurred in United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd
en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976), where the police knew
in advance the defendant's probable involvement in a criminal conspiracy and wanted to
follow him in order to locate other participants in the crime. Tracking of particular in-
dividuals, whose identity was known to the police in advance, also occurred in United
States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976); and United
States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976), although in those cases the police
were interested in the movements of property as well. The only case in which the police
interest in property arguably outweighed that in individuals was United States v. Emery,
541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976). There the beeper was attached to a parcel sent through the
mails, and police did not know the identity of the recipient until shortly before arrest.
138. The privacy of location and movement, like the privacy of conversation, may be
vulnerable to search pursuant to third party consent. No court has expressly focused on
this issue. Although cases such as United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. June 6, 1977), have assumed that a party who can effec-
tively consent to attachment of the beeper can also consent to monitoring, this result
does not necessarily follow. The Fourth Amendment's protection of the privacy of loca-
tion and movement may overlap its protection of property against physical intrusion,
but the scope of the two may not be coextensive.
To determine whether consent for monitoring is valid, courts must consider whether
the individual giving consent has authority to permit surveillance of those matters the
beeper tracks. Where the object of the tracking is only property, the consenting in-
dividual's degree of control over the property is likely to be the determinative factor. See
note 116 supra. Ownership alone may be insufficient to validate consent if the owner has
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heavily upon factual circumstances, it is impossible to say in the
abstract precisely when electronic tracking may invade privacy of
location and movement. In certain cases, however, the probability of
such an invasion is extremely high.
The most obvious invasion occurs where a beeper monitors the
location or movement of persons or property within an enclosed,
private area where reasonably curious members of the public may not
go. In these circumstances the beeper conveys information concerning
matters that have been sealed entirely from public view. 3 9 Such mat-
ters may of course be negligently exposed to others.140 If, for example,
the lights are on and the curtains are not drawn, a reasonably curious
passerby might take note of movements inside a house? 41 But a beeper
does not rely on such fortuitous circumstances; it performs its task
even when all apertures have been tightly shut.
Although an individual's travels or those of his property may take
place in public, they may be protected from observation with almost
absolute certainty. A person who enters a closed vehicle in an en-
closed garage and then is chauffered to an equally private destina-
tion has effectively precluded observation of his passage by others.
Similarly, a package loaded onto an enclosed truck in a private ware-
house and then transported to another warehouse can escape public
surrendered the property into another's care. But if an individual maintains a con-
tinuing interest in possession or use, such that he might direct the property's return or
other disposition at any time, then his consent for surveillance should relieve necessity
for a warrant. Even without such authority, an informant with knowledge amounting to
certainty concerning the property's location and route might, as an alternative to
notifying the police directly, permit them to engage in electronic tracking. Cf. United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (discussed at note
107 supra).
A more difficult case arises where the beeper is used to track the location or move-
ment of persons. An individual's movements are unlikely, except perhaps in the course of
employment, to be subject to another person's authority or control. Use of beepers to
track persons thus should require a warrant in most circumstances. Again, however,
White would permit warrantless monitoring through the consent of an informant, e.g.,
a travelling companion having knowledge of his associate's location or movement.
139. See United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (warrantless tele-
scopic surveillance of interior of home violates Fourth Amendment). Current beeper tech-
nology probably lacks sufficient precision to permit monitoring of an individual's move-
ments within close quarters. As technology improves, however, this kind of monitoring
may become possible. Even now, a beeper may be used to determine whether a package
secluded on private property has been opened. See United States v. Emery, 542 F.2d 887,
888 &, n.1 (1st Cir. 1976); note 3 supra.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 840 (1976) (defendant who placed jacket on coat rack in public lobby charged with
knowledge that others might peer into pockets). See Note, A Man's Home Is His Fort,
supra note 65, at 70-72, 75-77.
141. See, e.g., People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d 84, 91-94, 453 P.2d 721, 725-26, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 217, 221-22 (1969) (not a search where government agents looked through opening
in curtains).
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notice. In either case, a beeper capable of tracking the movements of
the individual or the package intrudes on protected privacy.
142
Furthermore, there may be circumstances where an individual who
has taken no steps to avoid observation by the public, and has thus
"assumed the risk" of visual observation, 14 3 may still claim Fourth
Amendment protection against electronic monitoring. A traveler in
public may be seen by many people, and his location at any given
point may be known. It is also possible that reasonably curious persons
might follow him for relatively brief periods and short distances. But
continuous tailing by one person for a long distance or time is un-
likely..44 An individual may thus be entitled to rely on the privacy of
his "route," even if segments of it are exposed. When a beeper is used
to track an individual's route by continuous and lengthy monitoring,
the individual's privacy may thus be invaded though he took no ap-
parent steps to protect it.145
142. An individual has several other protective means at his disposal: he may go out
only for brief periods; he may travel at hours when the streets are likely to be empty; lie
may travel by circuitous routes; he may disguise his identity; or he may resort to places
where others are unlikely to follow. Similar additional means are available for concealing
the location and movement of property.
That an individual does not sacrifice entirely his rights to privacy by entering a
public place is well established, despite occasional dicta to the contrary. See Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.) ("tie exercise of a
desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one's right to be free of unreasonable
government intrusion"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("unquestionably [one is]
entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walk[s] down the street").
But see Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
995 (1971) (en banc) (Fourth Amendment "is not a shield against the inevitable loss of
privacy which accompanies one's decision to go out into the world and mingle with his
fellow man").
143. See United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
533 (1976) (person traveling in public subject to observation by government agents as well
as general public); cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion
of White, J.) (person making oral disclosures takes risk that intended auditor of conversa-
tion may disclose contents to police).
144. The extent to which a reasonably curious person might follow another individu-
al is a matter that does not admit of precise determination. Certainly, however, it is
possible that one person might follow another for several city blocks, or even across a
fairly large town, without passing the bounds of reasonable curiosity. By contrast, a
24-hour "tail" of another's movements, or pursuit of an individual over a distance of
50 or 100 miles, would signify more than normal curiosity in that person's affairs.
145. The argument presented here suggests that even long-term visual surveillance
may result in a search subject to Fourth Amendment warrant requirements. The invasion
of privacy inherent in long-term spying has periodically been recognized, although ob-
jection to this mode of police investigation usually focuses on the deceptiveness rather
than the duration of the investigatory techniques. Note, Judicial Control of Secret
Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 994, 1018-19 (1967). See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 344-48
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that "planting" of government spies implicates
Fourth Amendment); Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 407.
Lengthy observation without deception may also seriously curtail an individual's
privacy. See Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001
(1965) (district court granted preliminary injunction against 24-hour FBI surveillance of
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The reported beeper cases illustrate the kinds of privacy invasion
that result from monitoring. Several cases have involved the tracking of
property or persons whose movements remained secluded from public
view, both during their transportation over public thoroughfares and
at their final destination.1 46 In each case a substantial interest in
privacy was invaded by the tracking activity. 147 A somewhat more
difficult situation is presented by those cases in which beepers were
used to track motor vehicles and their occupants on public highways.
In many of these cases, however, the vehicles were driven by circuitous
routes, on long journeys, or to remote destinations. 48 The most strik-
ing example is United States v. French, where the journey traversed
four states.'49 In these cases, the operators of the monitored vehicles
plaintiff's movements on grounds that constitutional rights of privacy violated; circuit
court dismissed for failure to allege damages meeting jurisdictional amount require-
ment); cf. Weinreb, supra note 93, at 82-83 (continuous television surveillance of open
areas where individuals accustomed to go unobserved may invade privacy). But see
United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 513 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1975) (one month of continu-
ous surveillance without probable cause permitted; subsequent warrantless search pursuant
to arrest at border justified on grounds of exigency).
146. Secluded property was tracked in United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976) (chemical drum enclosed in truck); United States
v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976) (television placed
in automobile); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (D. Mass. 1976) (pack-
age of chemicals in van); and United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 802 (W.D. Okla.
1976) (bags of marijuana enclosed in truck and barn).
Tracking of secluded persons (at their destinations) occurred in, e.g., United States v.
Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), af'd en bane by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d
227 (5th Cir. 1976) (occupants of van traced to secluded farm); United States v. Bobisink,
415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976) (purchasers of chemicals traced to private house); and
United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (driver of vehicle traced to
private farm).
147. This is so even if the tracking involved property that was contraband. It has
been suggested that one can have no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.
See United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1976) (contraband is property
which defendant "had no right to possess" and in which he "had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy"); United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 804 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (one
can have "no legitimate purpose" in concealing contraband); note 131 supra. This sug-
gestion conflicts with the analysis developed in this Note. It rests on the social accept-
ability of the privacy interest at stake rather than on the means taken to protect it. It
seems clear that contraband, like Katz's illegal conversations, may be as securely pro-
tected from detection by reasonably curious persons as any other item. Where contra-
band's location and movement are so protected, use of a beeper should require a judicial
warrant. Moreover, where contraband is used as a means for tracking the movements of
persons or other items of property, the tracking may invade independent privacy in-
terests, requiring a warrant whether or not the contraband itself is protected by the
Fourth Amendment. See note 131 supra.
148. E.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
533 (1976) (defendants took circuitous route); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859,
861-62 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en bane by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.
1976) (departure in early morning hours, travel to remote and sparsely populated region).
149. 414 F. Supp. 800, 802 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (movement also involved surreptitious
exchange of vehicles). The court noted that visual as well as electronic surveillance was
maintained at all times. Id. But see note 145 supra.
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took steps reasonably calculated to preserve their movements from
detection by the public at large; arguably they were protected by the
Fourth Amendment from continuous police monitoring.150
In several cases beepers continued to monitor their subjects after
they entered private enclosures.1 T ' Because the beepers were attached
to items not likely to be secured on an individual's person, the only
information conveyed concerning location was that the monitored
item had entered onto private property. It is, of course, possible to
observe entry from a public vantage, and so it might be argued that
the beeper conveyed only information that was accessible to the
reasonably curious person, though its signals originated from a private
enclosure. 1 2 To determine whether entry was in fact exposed to the
public, however, it is necessary to consider whether the individual
took steps to guard his entry against observation. Where such precau-
tions were taken, even if they consisted of nothing more than ascer-
taining that no one was in sight, use of a beeper intruded on privacy.153
In at least one case, the fact of entry appears to have been concealed.154
In the other cases, the facts are inconclusive.
IV. Applicability of Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
Electronic tracking, then, generally involves both physical and non-
physical invasions of Fourth Amendment rights. It remains to be
seen, however, whether these invasions may be justified as an excep-
tion to Fourth Amendment restraints.'5 Generally exceptions are justi-
150. Tracking of airplanes presents a different issue. The location of airborne
vehicles is regularly monitored by government radar, a form of "regulatory" search that
may be excepted from Fourth Amendment warrant requirements. See p. 1497 infra.
But this rationale does not justify the holding in United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d
517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), that electronic tracking of airplanes is not a search.
First, tracking the "route" of an individual airplane may intrude beyond the govern-
ment's regulatory authority. See People v. Smith, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767, 771 (Ct. App.
1977). Second, since it is highly unlikely that the reasonably curious person would follow
an airplane, the airplane user need not make a special effort to preserve his privacy. See
p. 1494 supra.
151. See note 20 supra (citing cases).
152. An argument similar to this was made by the court in United States v. French,
414 F. Supp. 800, 805 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
153. One commentator has argued that for similar reasons use of police airplanes and
helicopters to conduct airborne visual searches may intrude on privacy. Comment, supra
note 103, at 527-36.
154. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by
an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant traveled at night and
during early morning hours, thereby escaping visual surveillance from both the ground
and the air).
155. Several judicial opinions have suggested that warrantless beeper searches are
justifiable under standard exceptions to the warrant requirement. See note 167 infra.
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fied under either of two primary rationales. First, a search based on
probable cause may be conducted without a warrant when "exigent
circumstances," such as danger,1 1 "hot pursuit,"'-57 or "fleeting op-
portunity"'158 for search, make compliance with the warrant require-
ment impracticable. 1 9 Second, a warrantless search that is routine,
limited, and regulatory in nature may be justified, even in the absence
of probable cause, on the ground that the narrow scope of such a
search satisfies the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. 160 Only in rare instances should either of these excep-
tional rationales be used to justify beeper searches. 06
1
156. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (warrant requirement may
not be ignored except in "grave emergency").
157. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (warrantless search of building
for robbery suspect within minutes of robbery not a violation of Fourth Amendment).
The term "hot pursuit" appears in the concurring and dissenting opinions. Id. at 310
(Fortas, J., concurring); id. at 321 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
158. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459-60 (1971) (plurality opinion of
Stewart, J.) (automobile search permitted only when justified by "fleeting opportunity");
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970) (same).
159. Searches under exigent circumstances also include searches of motor vehicles,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925);
searches incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (limits of rationale
defined; search in instant case illegal); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); and
"stop and frisk" searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Amsterdam, supra note
75, at 374; The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 110, 117-21 (1967). For a
thorough catalogue of the circumstances that have been held to establish exigency, see
Guzman v. Estelle, 493 F.2d 532, 536-37 (5th Cir. 1974).
160. The concept of "reasonable search" has its roots in pre-Katz doctrine. It rests on
the notion that under certain circumstances a search may be reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment although the police do not establish probable cause
and obtain a warrant. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warrant, but not
probable cause, required for administrative search); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967) (same); Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled on other
grounds, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (warrantless search may be reasonable
even though opportunity to obtain warrant existed). See generally Greenberg, supra note
71; LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See
Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 1; The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 69, 120-21
(1967).
Warrantless searches that have been upheld on the grounds of reasonableness in the
absence of probable cause include: airport searches, United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d
496 (2d Cir. 1974); border searches, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976);
automobile inventory searches, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); and
vehicle identification checks, United States v. Montgomery, No. 75-1715, majority slip
op. at 14-17 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 1977); United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970).
For one commentator's effort to establish a common theoretical foundation for exceptions
based on exigent circumstances and those based on the doctrine of reasonableness, see
Weinreb, supra note 93, at 79-80.
161. It might also be asserted that beeper searches may be justified under two other
exceptions to the warrant requirement that permit searches of items in "open fields"
and of items in "plain view." See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (open fields
exception); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (plain view exception). To
assert that tracking is a search in open fields is to claim that it is analogous to visual
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The rationale supporting warrantless searches of a routine, limited,
and regulatory nature is clearly inapplicable0 2 and no beeper court
has ever suggested the contrary. Beeper searches are not brief, minimal-
ly intrusive, or routine.163 Moreover, electronic tracking lacks the
procedural safeguards that have generally been required under this
exception. 64 Even if such procedures were developed, the variety of
observation. This argument has already been shown to be without foundation. See pp.
1491-92 supra.
The plain view exception, however, may apply to electronic tracking in certain cir-
cumstances. Originally, the plain view exception was used to justify search and seizure
of items discovered during the course of a legal search but not included in the initial
warrant. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1927). The doctrine has since
been expanded to permit search and seizure of "objects falling in the plain view of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view." Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
Applied literally, the exception would not permit the use of beepers, because the ex-
ception pertains in terms only to visual observation by an officer. A variant of the
plain view theory, however, has developed in the context of wiretapping. This variant
permits use of evidence discovered during the course of legal surveillance, even if it is
not covered in the scope of the original warrant. See United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d
679, 686-87 & n.10 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972). The wiretap is
analogized to a police presence, so that items within its reach are considered to be
within the "view" of law enforcement officials.
If this theory were applied to beepers, it would require that the beeper be legally in
the place from which the "view" is obtained. Thus, while plain view may justify sub-
sequent tracking, it may not justify the original placement of the beeper. If the beeper
is illegally attached, then the analogy fails. Moreover, even where attachment is legal,
the plain view exception covers only those subsequent discoveries that are inadvertent.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.).
Courts have long recognized that unless discoveries justified under plain view are ac-
cidental, police could manipulate the exception to avoid the particularity requirements
for search and seizure set by the Fourth Amendment, see p. 1506 infra.
Despite the various limitations on the plain view exception, it is possible to imagine
circumstances in which the exception might justify warrantless electronic tracking. If
police were to obtain a warrant for electronically tracking one person's movements by
car, and the automobile was subsequently used by someone else, inadvertently dis-
covered information about the second person's movements could be used by the police
although the second individual was not covered by the original warrant.
162. The theory itself may be of dubious validity, to the degree that it defines
Fourth Amendment protections in terms of the relationship between the individual and
the government. Taken to its extreme, the theory would permit the government to
emasculate the warrant requirement in many situations merely by commencing a pro-
gram of wholesale search pursuant to some regulatory power, and thereby creating the
"lesser expectation of privacy" from which the search derives its justification. See p. 1475
supra. Probably the most striking example of this phenomenon has come as a result
of the increase in airport security in recent years. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498
F.2d 496, 498-99 (2d Cir. 1974) (government may take reasonable measures to protect
against air piracy; travellers on notice that they may be searched).
163. The characteristics of electronic tracking contrast with those of regulatory
searches justified as reasonable. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880
(1975) (roving border patrol checks usually last "no more than a minute"); United
States v. Montgomery, No. 75-1715, majority slip op. at 13 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 1977)
(duration of search one of several criteria determining intrusiveness); United States v.
Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1970) (vehicle identification check involved detention
of extreme brevity).
164. The developing case law suggests that to qualify for this exception, a search
must be regulated by procedures that are standardized and systematically enforced, that
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circumstances in which beepers may be used would require the
exercise of considerable discretion by police officers, thus leaving
room for arbitrary action. 165 Indeed, the beeper's secrecy enhances the
potential for abuse. Finally, the government does not have the broad
regulatory power over individuals' movements that could justify ex-
cepting electronic tracking from the warrant requirement under the
routine search rationale.106
The exigency rationale is equally inapplicable in most circum-
stances. 10 Exigency arising from imminent danger to police or others
is unlikely to justify electronic tracking because tracking does nothing
to mitigate such danger. Attaching a beeper does not aid police in
gaining immediate control over dangerous weapons or persons. A
beeper might be used to lead police to the persons or items thought
to be dangerous, but the passage of time required for that result would
eliminate the search's exigency'60 and destroy the justification for not
seeking a warrant.
It might be possible for police to use the beeper, however, as an
effective aid in "hot pursuit" of a criminal. For example, during a
minimize potential abuse from selective harassment, and that place no stigma of
suspected wrongdoing on the subjects of the search. Compare South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (inventory search controlled by standardized procedures)
and United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (no stigma attached to
airport search procedures that apply to all passengers alike) with United States v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891, 895-96 (1975) (checkpoint procedures allow too much discretion and in-
volve too much potential for selective harassment to meet Fourth Amendment standards
for reasonableness) and United States v. Montgomery, No. 75-1715, majority slip op. at
6-7, 15 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 1977) (roving traffic stop based on officer's "inarticulate
hunch" derived from conduct consistent with innocent behavior conferred undue discre-
tion; regulatory search must be systematic).
165. For an example of an effort to overcome this problem, see Drug Enforcement
Administration Domestic Operations Guidelines, Dec. 28, 1976, reprinted in 20 CGlf. L.
REr. (BNA) 3055, 3058 (Feb. 2, 1977) (DEA guidelines for use of beepers requiring either
authorization by a "Group Supervisor or higher authority" or "a Federal court order
in the nature of a warrant ... if installation involves a trespass or if otherwise required
by the Federal case law"). These DEA procedures, however, provide no systematic criteria
for determining when tracking is to be authorized.
166. Cf., e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4577, 4579-82 (U.S. June 6, 1977)
(sovereign control over entry across borders together with congressional authorization
justifies warrantless search on "reasonable suspicion" of incoming international mail);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (automobile inventory search
justified in part by police traffic regulatory functions); United States v. Edwards, 498
F.2d 496, 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (airport search justified by government's strong regula-
tory interest in protecting air travelers' safety).
167. Only one beeper decision has rested expressly on a finding of exigent circum-
stances. United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 823 (1977) (automobile and hot pursuit exceptions). The existence of exigent cir-
cumstances was adopted as an alternative rationale in United States v. French, 414 F.
Supp. 800, 804-06 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (also invoking open fields exception), and was urged
by the dissent in United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane;
per curiam) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
168. See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 110, 122 (1967).
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bank robbery, a bank teller acting as an agent for the police might
slip a beeper into a money bag, thereby enabling the police to track
the culprits.169 To serve this purpose, the beeper would have to be
attached at the scene of the crime or immediately thereafter, at a time
when it would be impossible for police to obtain a warrant. The hot
pursuit doctrine, however, would justify only brief tracking: long-
lasting monitoring would call into question the degree to which the
pursuit was in fact "hot."'1 0
Exigency based on a "fleeting opportunity" permits warrantless
searches in situations where the delay necessary to procure a warrant
would destroy the opportunity for a fruitful search, as, for example,
where the objects of the search are likely to be destroyed, concealed,
or removed.1'71 Since the subjects of electronic tracking are mobile and
are likely to avoid police surveillance unless monitored, it might ap-
pear that a fleeting opportunity exists in nearly every beeper search.
To apply the fleeting opportunity exception to beeper searches, how-
ever, substantially alters its scope. In its typical application, the
doctrine permits a police officer to conduct a search for physical
evidence immediately in his presence. 72 This form of warrantless
search is often justified as a less intrusive alternative to detention while
a warrant is being procured.'7 3 A beeper does nothing to aid such
169. This was done in United States v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 133 (1976).
170. Use of the "hot pursuit" rationale in United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322,
1325 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 823 (1977), may not have been justified. Al-
though the situation was grave because the extortioner under surveillance was carrying
explosives, and although the pursuit was brief, the beeper was placed on the defendant's
car the night before the extortion attempt was expected to occur. Since the police were
operating on information from a reliable informant, and since there were apparently no
exigent circumstances at the time the beeper was placed, it is at least arguable that
there was adequate opportunity to obtain a warrant.
171. The classic example is the search of an automobile on the open highway, where
the vehicle and its contents may be easily removed unless an immediate search is con-
ducted. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The impracticability of obtaining
a warrant may no longer be an essential element of a justification for warrantless auto-
mobile searches. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595-96 (1974) (plurality opinion of
Blackmun, J.). But the requirement seems to be intact with respect to other exceptions.
See United States v. Chadwick, 45 U.S.L.WV. 4797, 4801 (U.S. June 21, 1977) (opportunity
to obtain warrant defeats claim of exigency for warrantless search of locked trunk taken
into police custody).
172. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (exigency rationale for search
incident to arrest permits only search of areas subject to arrestee's immediate control in
order to prevent physical danger or destruction of evidence); United States v. Chadwick,
45 U.S.L.W. 4797, 4801 (U.S. June 21, 1977) (locked trunk seized contemporaneously with
arrest may not be subsequently searched without a warrant; affirming Chirnel); Note,
supra note 145, at 1018, 1019.
173. Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (automobile search justified in
part on ground that it is less intrusive than posting of police guard until warrant can
be obtained).
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a search. Rather, the beeper's purpose is to convey intangible evidence
not immediately present, indeed not yet in existence. The current loca-
tion of the item or person is already known; the beeper's only purpose
is to track future location and movement, matters beyond the scope of
a search justified by exigency.
74
There are two counterarguments that support application of the
"fleeting opportunity" doctrine to beepers. First, the beeper could
operate as an alternative to detention. If, for example, cause arises to
search an automobile, electronic tracking might be used to monitor
the vehicle's location until a warrant can be procured. Such a use of
the beeper, however, would only be permissible as an alternative to
immediate search, since the exigent circumstance justifying the attach-
ment would evaporate once the search took place. Moreover, using the
beeper would be more intrusive than search on the spot, because in
addition to enabling a subsequent search of the automobile's contents
no less intrusive than a spot search, the beeper would allow a con-
tinuing surveillance of the vehicle's location during the intervening
period. For this reason immediate search should be required as the
less intrusive alternative.
Second, opportunities to attach the beeper may themselves be
fleeting. The delay involved in procuring a warrant may allow an
opportunity for attachment of the beeper to pass, thereby frustrating
the search.175 Police may be unable to predict when an opportunity
will arise to place a beeper, and the cumbersome procedure of obtain-
ing a warrant may prevent them from exercising those opportunities
174. United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 804 (W.D. Okla. 1976), argues that a
kind of continuing exigency exists when a beeper is used to track property that might
otherwise be removed or destroyed. In that case, however, "exigency" was created by the
government agents themselves, when they permitted contraband marijuana to be delivered
rather than seizing it at the border as they unquestionably had a right to do. When the
search and the exigent circumstance are thus separated in time, a warrant is usually
required. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (arrest of suspect in front of his
house does not permit search of interior after arrest accomplished); cf. G.M. Leasing Co.
v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 619, 624-25, 631-32 (1977) (tax authorities who had lien on
petitioner's property could not justify on exigency grounds a warrantless search of peti-
tioner's office since authorities had delayed entry while maintaining surveillance for
several days). But see United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1578 (1977) (en banc) (exigency arising from mobility of contraband
delivery truck not eliminated by constant surveillance by agents prior to arrest).
175. This argument could have been raised both in United States v. Holmes, 521
F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), af 'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th
Cir. 1976), and in United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976). In the
former case a beeper was attached to the defendant's automobile while he was con-
ferring with an undercover agent to finalize plans for an illegal drug transaction. 521
F.2d at 861. But see p. 1502 & note 178 infra. In the latter case, although one beeper
had already been attached to a package of chemicals ordered by the defendants, a
second beeper was placed on their rented van while they were in the process of picking
up their purchase, 415 F. Supp. at 1336.
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that become available. But this problem is significantly different from
the kinds of fleeting opportunity that traditionally justify warrantless
intrusion. What converts a fleeting opportunity into an exigent cir-
cumstance is the simultaneous conjunction of cause and opportunity
for search. 170 In the beeper situation, cause ordinarily arises prior to
attachment. Therefore, insistence on a warrant would seldom frustrate
a search: once the warrant is obtained, police could await an appro-
priate opportunity for attachment. 7
7
Indeed, in most of the reported beeper cases, police had ample op-
portunity to obtain a warrant before attaching a beeper. In Holmes,
for example, police could anticipate well in advance the planned
meeting between their agent and the suspects they wished to track.'"
In United States v. Emery and in French, delivery of contraband dis-
covered upon entry into the United States could have been delayed in
order to allow time to secure a warrant.179
In the rare case in which cause and opportunity do arise simulta-
neously, the police should be permitted to claim an exigent circum-
stance. They should be required, however, to apply for a warrant as
soon as possible after the tracking begins. 80
V. Compliance With Warrant Requirements: Formulating
Special Procedures
In all but a few exceptional circumstances, warrants should be ob-
tained before electronic tracking is begun. Consequently, it is necessary
to consider how the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and par-
ticularity requirements for search warrants should be applied to
176. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 390 (D.C. Gir. 1970) (if warrant
requirement is waived because of exigency, search must be prompt).
177. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) was recently amended to permit preliminary warrant
authorizations to be obtained by telephone. 18 U.S.C.A. app. at 18 (West Supp. 1977)
(amendment submitted to Congress by Supreme Court); Act of July 8, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-349, 90 Stat. 822 (postponing effective date of amendment to August 1977). This change
will significantly reduce the burden of antecedent justification for search in exigent
situations and may render the exigency rationale inapplicable for nearly all beeper
searches. Cf. United States v. Turner, 21 CRIMs. L. REP. (BNA) 2289 (2d Cir. June 2, 1977)
(upholding telephone authorization as sufficient compliance with Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement even absent statutory provision).
178. 537 F.2d 227, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc; per curiam) (Ainsworth, J., dis-
senting). An additional reason for not applying the fleeting opportunity doctrine in
Holmes is that the prerequisite of probable cause, see p. 1497 supra, had not been
satisfied. 521 F.2d at 866-67.
179. United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888 (Ist Cir. 1976); United States v. French,
414 F. Supp. 800, 801 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
180. The requirement of prompt post hoc application for a warrant applies when
exigent circumstances are used to justify a warrantless wiretap. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)
(1970) (application for warrant must be made within 48 hours after placement of tap in
cases of exigency).
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beepers. Electronic tracking is an unusual form of search because it is
not limited to a particular time or place. Like other forms of electronic
surveillance, the beeper is indiscriminate; it may convey information
totally irrelevant to the purposes of the search. Therefore, it is con-
stitutionally necessary to establish special beeper warrant procedures
similar to those mandated for electronic eavesdropping in Berger v.
New York' s' and subsequently embodied in the federal wiretapping
statute.' " The need for special warrant procedures for beepers can
be demonstrated by applying the concepts of probable cause and
particularity to electronic tracking.
A. Probable Cause
Probable cause for search and seizure has two requisites. First, the
items or information sought by the police must be "seizable":183 the
government must assert a valid interest in obtaining them by virtue of
their relationship to the prosecution or detection of a crime. 84 Second,
that interest must be served by the proposed search: the items or in-
formation to be seized must be likely to be discovered in the place to
be searched.'8 5 By analogy to conventional methods of search and
seizure, the item "seized" by electronic tracking is information con-
cerning the movements of the property or persons tracked. The place
"searched" is the item to which the beeper is attached. The govern-
ment, then, must establish a valid interest in knowing the movements
181. 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967).
182. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2518 (1970).
183. Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961).
184. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967), paints with a broad brush the
range of "seizable" items. Nonetheless, it is clear that some nexus between the in-
formation or object seized and the criminal activity being investigated is required.
Otherwise, the government could spy on activities in which it had no legitimate interest
and which might in fact be protected by constitutional guarantee. See United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-21 (1972) (warrantless "domestic security"
wiretapping allows harassment of those with unorthodox political views in violation of
First as well as Fourth Amendment). Tracking of location and movement, without an
adequate showing of its connection to criminal activity, might similarly infringe on
constitutionally protected freedoms of travel and assembly.
185. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (probable cause for automobile
search requires "a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to
seizure"); Note, supra note 183, at 687; see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 166
(1949) ("ultimate facts" establishing probable cause for search of suspected liquor runner's
automobile included knowledge that route and mode of transportation had been used in
prior illicit dealings); cf. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 863 n.7, 866 (5th Cir.
1975), aff'd en bane by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (district
court held that placement of beeper on van not supported by probable cause because
agents had no reliable information on which to form belief that van would be used to
transport marijuana).
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of the persons or property to be tracked, an interest arising out of
their relation to criminal activity; and it must be able to show that
the means of tracking to be employed, including the timing of attach-
ment and the actual placement of the beeper are likely to produce the
information sought.
The chief difficulty in establishing probable cause for tracking lies
in the required demonstration of a significant relationship between
information about the location and movement of individuals or prop-
erty and the government's gathering of evidence concerning a crime.
Although location and movement may at times be material evidence
of crime, 8 6 in most situations the relation to criminal activity is more
remote. Ordinarily the government seeks to trace the movements of
persons or property on the theory that they will lead to a locus of
criminal activity.'8 7 The chief value of tracking is to facilitate sub-
sequent searches for criminals and evidence of crime once this locus is
discovered.
Because the information received through tracking is likely to be
at least one step removed from the crime under investigation, govern-
ment requests for a warrant to track an individual electronically may
as often as not be based on "the merest of suspicions."'' 88 To ensure
that the beeper search is in fact justified, magistrates should require a
showing of sound reasons for believing that the proposed tracking
operation will reveal pertinent facts of criminal activity. Evidence
tending to show that the property to be monitored may be an in-
strumentality of crime, or that the person to be monitored is likely to
be one of the perpetrators, would supply the requisite nexus.18 9 In the
absence of such evidence, there is an unacceptably high risk that
electronic tracking may needlessly invade the privacy of innocent
persons.
Even when a close nexus exists between surveillance of location and
detection of crime, the government must show some reason why
186. An example would be where crossing state lines is a material element of the
offense.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 533 (1976) (attempt to locate site of illegal drug manufacture); United States v.
Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court,
537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (attempt to locate site of illegal contraband).
188. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en bane by an
equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); cf. United States v. McCaleb, 45
U.S.L.W. 2520 (6th Cir. April 11, 1977) (activities consistent with innocent behavior do not
establish cause for even limited search).
189. Similar requirements have been established for wiretapping and other forms of
electronic surveillance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a), (b), (d) (1970).
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electronic tracking is necessary. Electronic surveillance is one of the
most intrusive methods of discovering the location of criminals or
evidence of crime; less intrusive methods such as visual tailing, ex-
amination of lodging registrations and other public travel information,
and questioning of witnesses might often be reasonable alternatives.
To justify the greater intrusion of electronic tracking, the police
should be required to show that these other methods of search are
likely to be ineffective or unduly burdensome. 190
Long-term electronic tracking runs the additional risk of "stale
probable cause":19' although an individual's movements may initially
appear to be related to criminal activity, subsequent events may
undermine the original justification. In order to halt the beeper's
invasion of privacy once probable cause for a beeper warrant no longer
exists, an issuing judge should include in the warrant express provi-
sions for regular review of the progress of the search and should limit
the absolute duration of the search to the shortest period consistent
with demonstrated police needs.
192
Once the "seizability" of location and movement is established, the
means of search must be shown to be reasonably likely to produce the
information sought. The government must indicate how it intends to
attach the beeper, and the magistrate must judge whether the timing
of the attachment and the placement of the beeper are likely to result
in the seizure of appropriate information. 193 Where the property to
which the beeper is attached is closely related to the crime under
investigation, this requirement presents no problem. Similarly, where
the property is subject to exclusive possession by an individual suspect,
attachment of a beeper is probably a reliable means of tracking his
movements. But where property is likely to change hands or is subject
to use by persons other than those under investigation, the danger of
190. Compare United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Mass. 1976)
(where visual surveillance is a reasonable alternative there can be no urgent need for
tracking) with Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) (there must be showing of
exigency to justify not informing suspect of electronic eavesdropping).
191. See generally Comment, A Fresh Look at Stale Probable Cause: Examining the
Timeliness Requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 59 IowA L. REv. 1308 (1974).
192. A similar problem with respect to electronic eavesdropping led the Court to
conclude in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), that the potential for "in-
discriminate use" of electronic surveillance places on courts a "'heavier responsibility'"
than usual to supervise the fairness of warrant procedures. Id. at 329 n.7 (quoting Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result)). See
United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 884 (D.D.C. 1976), afJ'd, 45 U.S.L.W. 2411 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 11, 1977) (judicial control over electronic surveillance must be strict).
193. See United States v. Ford, 414 F. Snpp. 879, 884 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 45 U.S.L.W.
2411 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1977); Comment, supra note 191, at 1308-09.
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unwarranted intrusions into the privacy of third parties may be too
great to permit a warrant.19 4
B. Particularity
A search not only must be justified by a valid governmental interest
but also must be narrowly confined to the particular places and things
to which that interest extends.' 95 The requirement of particularity in
warrant applications protects against general searches in which a single
warrant is used as a "passkey" for intrusion into matters in which the
government has no justifiable interest.' 90 Electronic tracking shares
many of the problems of particularity that Berger associated with
electronic eavesdropping. Tracking is a secretive, continuous, and in-
discriminate form of search, which may convey much information con-
cerning perfectly innocent movements. It may intrude on the privacy
of third parties. It may comprise, in effect, a series of searches pursuant
to a single showing of probable cause. Furthermore, because the sub-
ject of the search receives no notice of the surveillance, there is no
opportunity for innocent parties to seek legal redress in cases of
abuse. 197
To remedy similar defects in electronic monitoring of conversations,
Berger held that a valid warrant must be particularized by a descrip-
tion of the conversations to be intercepted, a limit on the duration of
the search, a provision for discontinuing surveillance when the desired
information is obtained, and a specification of the reason for with-
holding notice from the subjects of the search.'0 8 These requirements,
reinforced by the Court's holding in Katz, form the substance of the
warrant requirements set forth in § 802 of Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.'99
C. Proposed Warrant Procedures
Title III provides a good index for warrant procedures that would
adequately safeguard the use of beepers. To ensure that a beeper
194. The controlling standard is that there must be "no greater invasion of privacy
- . . than [is] necessary under the circumstances." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57
(1967). This standard does not, however, require a "rifle shot" search so limited that
it picks up only information relevant to the crime. Even traditional searches are not so
narrowly constrained. See United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974). The rule must be one of common sense. See note 200
infra.
195. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967).
196. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157-62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing).
197. 388 U.S. at 58-60.
198. Id.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970).
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warrant is founded on probable cause, the following showings should
be required:
- that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed;
- that tracking of the persons or property specified in the ap-
plication is likely to reveal evidence of the crime, or the loca-
tion of the criminals;
- that the persons or property to be tracked are directly involved
in the crime;
- that alternative methods of investigation are likely to be bur-
densome or ineffective;
- that existing exigent circumstances justify withholding notice
of the search. 200
To ensure that the search is conducted with the requisite particularity,
the court order authorizing the search should include:
-- a statement identifying the persons or property to be tracked;
- a statement narrowly defining the purpose of the search;
- a statement specifying the object on which and the method by
which the beeper is to be attached;
- where possible, a limit on the geographical extent of the track-
ing operation;
- a limit on the time period during which the search may con-
tinue;
- a statement of conditions requiring termination of the search in
advance of the specified time limit;
- provisions for submitting a return report on search activities;
- provisions for giving subsequent notice to the parties
searched.2
01
200. These standards are drawn from id. § 2518(3). The first three, taken together,
are intended to "link up specific person, specific offense and specific place" and to
ensure use "only under the most precise and discriminate circumstances." S. REP, No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CoW: CONG. & AD. NEwS
2112, 2191. The fourth proposed requirement-a showing that other methods of in-
vestigation are likely to be ineffective-is not specifically mandated by the standards set
in Berger, but Congress found it to be a widely practiced, common sense safeguard
against unnecessary electronic intrusions on privacy. Id. at 101, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CoDr CoNG. & AD. Nrws at 2190. Investigative methods other than tracking include
visual surveillance, the use of regular search warrants, and questioning or interrogation.
Of coure, as Congress noted in the context of electronic ea'esdropping, "[m]erely because
a normal iumestigative technique is theoretically possible, it does not follow that it is
likely [to succeed]." Id., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2190. The
proposed standards contemplate a common sense approach that limits the use of beepers
to situations in which tailing is necessary and visual observation is not practicable. Finally,
the required showing of exigency to justify withholding notice is drawn directly from
Berger's mandated procedtres for oral interception. See p. 1506 supra.
201. These requirements are based on 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970). The first four are
intended to limit the scope of the search. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 103
(1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2192. In many cases the
police may be unable to describe with particularity the movements they intend to monitor.
1507
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1461, 1977
Because beepers use radio waves subject to federal regulations, these
standards may be mandated for both federal and state law enforce-
ment agencies.2 02 Although these requirements go beyond the minimum
standards set by the Supreme Court in Berger and Katz, they parallel
the requirements of Title III. The same reasons that motivated Con-
gress to impose statutory constraints upon wiretapping and oral in-
terception militate in favor of its adopting a similar statutory frame-
work for electronic tracking. Such a statute would provide a uniform
set of guidelines for police and courts alike. It would also give
legislative recognition to the privacy interests that would be jeop-
ardized by widespread use of the beeper.20 3 It may be that a person's
location and movements are more frequently matters accessible to the
public than are his conversations, but he should be as free to preserve
the privacy of the one as of the other, without fear that his control
over his own privacy will be secretly wrested from him by an elec-
tronic device.
Presumably they would not be interested in electronic tracking if the destination and
route of travel were known. But it should be possible for police to make some estimate
of the extent of the travels they intend to monitor-whether, for example, they expect to
track the suspect across town or across the country. Requiring such a particularization,
as well as provisions for return on the warrant, would enable judicial supervision to
continue throughout the course of the tracking operation. Thus, if the search exceeded
its bounds, the magistrate would be able to revise or rescind the order in light of the
circumstances. This, together with the time limitation, should ensure that the intrusive-
ness of the search is minimized.
Similarly, although it may be difficult for police to predict the best method for at-
taching a beeper, judicial control over this aspect of the search should be particularly
strict, in order to guard against unnecessary inmsions of privacy resulting from multiple
surreptitious intrusions, and to minimize the degree of intrusion caused by installation.
See United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 884-85 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 45 U.S.L.W. 2411
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1977).
Time requirements for electronic tracking usually should be shorter than those
customarily permitted for oral interception. In most of the beeper cases decided thus
far, tracking was necessary only for a few days. A court order such as the one issued for
30 days in United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), is
probably overinclusive for most purposes. Although time limitations may not be a
current problem due to the limits of present technology, see note 3 supra, court orders
in the future must be careful to specify tracking periods that are reasonably limited to
law enforcement needs. Moreover, as is the case with wiretapping orders, particular care
should be exercised with respect to warrant renewals. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(f) (1970).
Provisions for subsequent notice are necessary for compliance with FED. R. CrM. P. 41(d).
202. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) (asserting federal control over interstate radio com-
munications, intrastate communications that affect or interfere with interstate com-
munications, and communications from "mobile stations"); ef. Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(a), 82 Stat. 211, reprinted
following 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1970) (congressional finding that wire communications used
inseparably for both interstate and intrastate communications).
203. Cf. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
III, § 801(b), (d), 82 Stat. 211, reprinted following 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1970) (congressional
findings concerning threat of electronic eavesdropping to personal privacy).
1508
